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I. INTRODUCTION
Famous as a lawyer, political activist, democratic theorist, ad-
visor to presidents, and Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
Louis Dembitz Brandeis is unquestionably a major figure in Ameri-
can history.' The greatest part of his fame, of course, arises from his
service on the Supreme Court and the reputation that he earned there
as one of the Court's truly great Justices.2 Even his severest critics-
and he has a number of them-concede to that greatness. 3 One gauge
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I For a sampling of the many books on Brandeis that are not otherwise cited below, see
generally GERALD BERK, Louis D. BRANDEIS AND THE MAKING OF REGULATED COMPETITION,
1900-1932 (2009); ROBERT A. BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED
LAND (1988); SUZANNE FREEDMAN, Louis BRANDEIS: THE PEOPLE'S JUSTICE (1996); ALLON
GAL, BRANDEIS OF BOSTON (1980); DAVID C. GROSS, A JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLE: LOUIS
D. BRANDEIS (1987); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946).
2 Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80
HARv. L. REV. 986, 987 (1967) ("[B]y common consent Brandeis is among the greatest of
Supreme Court judges."); Clyde Spillenger, Reading the Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel
and the Book of Brandeis, 79 J. AM. HIST. 125, 125 (1992) ("No one holds a more secure
place in this judicial pantheon than Louis D. Brandeis."). Brandeis has commonly been
ranked as a great justice. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: Factors That Influ-
ence Judicial Reputation, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 401, 403, 445-49 (1996); Bernard Schwartz, Su-
preme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest Justices, 31 TULSA L.J. 93, 93, 122-26 (1995).
3 E.g., THOMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Louis
D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 135 (1984) (criticizing Brandeis' flawed
contributions to regulatory theory and practice but conceding his greatness as a judge). For a
qualification of McCraw's critique, see Nelson L. Dawson, Brandeis and the New Deal, in
BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 38, 38-64 (Nelson L. Dawson ed., 1989). For criticisms of Brandeis
as a lawyer, see, e.g., Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as Peo-
ple's Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996), and as a judge, see, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
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of his high standing is the fact that judicial opinions have continued
long after his death to invoke his name, a kind of recognition that he
shares with only a handful of the Court's hundred-plus Justices who
have passed from the scene.' Perhaps even more impressive, is the
fact that it is his individual opinions-concurrences and dissents, not
majority opinions-that judges and scholars most commonly cite.'
Brandeis' "judicial mind," Alexander Bickel concluded, was "one,
surely, of the half-dozen most influential ones in our history .. ."6 in
this symposium, however, I attempt neither an evaluation of Brande-
is' achievements nor an assessment of his continuing influence.' In-
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 126, 143, 145,
146, 150 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION].
4 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (citing Brandeis' concur-
rence in Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)); Hodgson v. Minneso-
ta, 497 U.S. 417, 446 (1990) (citing Brandeis' dissent in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325,
335-36 (1920)); Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12
(1986) (citing Brandeis' concurrence in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 84 (1936)); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (citing Brandeis' dis-
sent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 53 (1976) (citing Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927)); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (citing Brandeis' concurrence in Ashwander,
297 U.S. at 345-48); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-80 (1966) (citing Brandeis' dis-
sent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76).
Individual Justices also frequently cite Brandeis by name in their separate opinions, see, e.g.,
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 152 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Brande-
is' dissent in Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 477-79, 483-85); W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S.
186, 216 (1994) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis' dissent in New State Ice Co.,
285 U.S. at 311); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1051 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 418 (1922)); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1000-01 (1983) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Brandeis' dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 247 (1926)); United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 709-10 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis'
dissent in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) and Brandeis' concurrence in St. Jo-
seph Stock Yards Co., 298 U.S. at 77); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 708
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Brandeis' dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)).
5 MELVIN J. UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE COURT'S
HISTORY AND THE NATION'S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 187 (2015). "Brandeis's dissents
would lay the foundation for the future and are the great examples of how one can engage in
and affect not just the constitutional dialogue but the larger question of what rights we value
as a free society." Id. at 151.
6 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, Preface to THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS: THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK, at vi (1957).
7 For an insightful consideration of Brandeis' continuing relevance, see Jeffrey Rosen,
Why Brandeis Matters, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 29, 2010),
https://newrepublic.com/article/75902/why-brandeis-matters. For an earlier assessment by
Brandeis' successor on the Court, see Hon. William 0. Douglas, The Lasting Influence of
Mr. Justice Brandeis, 19 TEM. L.Q. 361 (1945).
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stead, more broadly, I want to consider what his career on the
Court-his judicial legacy-can teach us about the nature of Ameri-
can constitutionalism.
II. BRANDEIS'S JUDICIAL LEGACY
Quite strikingly, Brandeis' judicial legacy began even before
he went on the high bench in 1916. His famous article on privacy,
published in 1890, resonated with later generations and became a
source repeatedly invoked on the long path that led to the establish-
ment of a constitutional right to privacy.! Equally well known, his
brief in Muller v. Oregon' in 1908, the famous "Brandeis brief,"
helped reorient constitutional argumentation by highlighting the im-
portance of the factual context in which rules of law are applied."
Once on the bench, he pressed both of those ideas, insisting that pri-
vacy was a fundamental right" and that a detailed understanding of
the relevant facts was a prerequisite for wise judging.12 The "logic of
words," he famously declared, "should yield to the logic of reali-
See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 n.12 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing
to Warren & Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 192 (1890)). Douglas, in turn,
wrote for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, expanding the right of privacy to include
fundamental rights involving privacy and the use of contraceptives. 381 U.S. 479, 480-86
(1961). In Griswold, Douglas did not cite Brandeis, but Justice Arthur Goldberg, joined by
Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan, concurred and cited Brandeis' dis-
senting opinion in Olmstead, which maintained that privacy rights are fundamental. Id. at
494 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note
5, at 204 ("[T]he Court and the country have accepted Brandeis's notion that the Constitution
embodies a right to be let alone."). It should be noted, however, that Brandeis' idea of a
right to privacy stemmed from far different concerns and values than did the constitutional
right to privacy that subsequently developed. See, e.g., Richard Chused, Appropriate(d)
Moments, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 103, 109-27 (2015).
9 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
10 On the Brandeis Brief, see PHILLIPPA STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE
PEOPLE 114-31 (1984) [hereinafter STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE]; MELVIN 1. UROFSKY,
Louis D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 213-27 (2009). For an argument minimizing the importance of
the Brandeis brief, see David E. Bernstein, Brandeis Brief Myths, 15 GREEN BAG 2D 9
(2011).
1 E.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Whitney,
274 U.S. 357, 372-73 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
12 Philippa Strum, Brandeis and the Living Constitution, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 120,
122 (Nelson L. Dawson ed., 1989) ("The most important contribution of Brandeis to consti-
tutional interpretation and to keeping the Constitution a living one was his emphasis on
facts."); UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 130 ("One thread that runs through
all his endeavors is the need to know the facts."). For Brandeis' judicial use of facts, see,
e.g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 597-616 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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ties."13
Brandeis's judicial legacy, of course, boasts a great many oth-
er contributions as well. He had a significant impact on a wide range
of doctrinal areas from antitrust and commercial law to administra-
tive law and utilities regulation,1 4 and he sometimes exerted an
unacknowledged influence over the Court's decisions when his inter-
nal advocacy among the Justices led them to alter their final opinions
and judgments." He was a leader in establishing legislative history
as an important source of judicial reasoning,1 6 and he was the first
Justice to cite law review articles in his opinions, a practice that ini-
tially drew objection but subsequently became widely accepted. 17
His famous metaphor of the states as laboratories' 8-a novel and
classic product of his early twentieth-century Progressivism--created
an enduring image of the federal system, an image that his successors
have repeatedly deployed and that has become widely accepted as a
fundamental principle of federalism.' 9
13 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). "Unless we
know the facts on which the legislators may have acted, we cannot properly decide whether
they were (or whether their measures are) unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious." Jay Bums
Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14 UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 610.
" BICKEL, supra note 6, at 67-68, 74, 96-99, 101, 202, 212; STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE
PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 369-70. As one student of the Court concluded from studying sev-
eral pairs of Justices, "the more influential and effective justice was the one more willing to
moderate the application of his principles in the name of the broader good of the Court and
the country." JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES
THAT DEFINED AMERICA 21 (2006).
16 BICKEL, supra note 6, at 59 ("Brandeis' method of ascertaining legislative purpose, for
which he gained no acceptance in [a particular] case, has made much headway. It is as nor-
mal today as it was unusual then for the Court to look to legislative materials for indications
of basic purpose and then to apply broadly or poorly worded statutes in conformity with that
purpose."). For a discussion of the uses of legislative history, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 365, 366 n.5 (1990) (suggesting that
Brandeis also had doubts about legislative history); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Ver-
sus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1653 (2010) (examining use and significance of legislative history on Court from 1953
to 2006).
17 UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 82, 474.
18 E.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
19 E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[T]he theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their
role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is
far from clear."). Brandeis developed the "states as laboratories" idea long before he went
on the Court. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 165-69 (2007) [hereinafter PURCELL,
8 Vol. 33
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Above all, it was in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence
where Brandeis had his greatest impact. 20  His opinions, addressing
such issues as the nature of executive power, the scope of the Com-
merce Clause, the contours of preemption, and the reach of the police
power helped shape contemporary constitutional law. To cite one
important if relatively technical example, he was a major force in
transforming the Court's choice-of-law jurisprudence under both the
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.2 '
Perhaps most centrally, Brandeis authored enduring opinions
that have shaped our understanding of the nature, role, and limits of
federal judicial power. In one direction, he was a paramount force in
developing ideas of judicial restraint and in forging a variety of doc-
trines to support the broad principle that federal courts are rigorously
limited in their powers.22 He urged the federal courts to exercise their
authority sparingly, defer in most instances to the actions of the other
levels and branches of government, and invoke the Constitution only
when absolutely necessary.2 3 In a series of opinions he spelled out
the reasons for giving legislatures broad discretion in enacting regula-
tory measures, 24 allowing ample leeway for administrative agencies
ORIGINALISM]. Reformers "ought to get the full benefit of experiments in individual states"
before proposing federal actions, he argued in 1912. "There is great advantage in the oppor-
tunity we have of working out our social problems in the detached laboratories of the differ-
ent states." 2 LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 640 (Melvin 1. Urofsky & David W. Levy
eds., 1972).
20 UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 640 ("[N]o justice of the twentieth cen-
tury had a greater impact on American constitutional jurisprudence.").
21 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA, 182-85 (2000); Clyde Spillenger, Risk Regulation, Extraterritoriality, and Domi-
cile: The Constitutionalization of American Choice of Law, 1850-1940, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1240,1302-19 (2015).
22 E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553, 605-23 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deer-
ing, 254 U.S. 443, 479-88 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Int'l News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248-67 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23 See EVAN TSEN LEE, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN AMERICA: HOW THE AGELESS WISDOM OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS WAS INVENTED 68 (2011) (explaining Brandeis was "the first Supreme
Court Justice to expound fully" on what later became known as "the countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty," the idea that judicial review conflicted with democratic government and should
therefore be exercised only as a last resort).
24 STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF
Louis DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 307 (1994) ("The particularities of a case were always of great
importance to Brandeis, but as we have seen this rarely prevented him from seeking the wid-
est possible powers of discretion for state legislatures.").
9
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to use their expertise, 25 and adhering strictly to the jurisdictional lim-
its that confined the reach of the federal courts. 2 6 "[T]he most im-
portant thing we do," he famously told Felix Frankfurter, "is not do-
ing."27
Brandeis not only urged that both policy and discretion fre-
quently counseled restraint, but he also stressed that Article III man-
dated constitutional limits as well. 28 The Court had long held that ju-
dicial relief was not available to a claimant who had not suffered an
injury, but since John Marshall's day it had considered that require-
ment rooted in the common law principle that judicial relief was
available only when a party had suffered injury from the invasion of a
legal right.2 9 In an opinion in 1922, however, Brandeis transformed
that injury requirement into an explicitly constitutional limitation on
the federal judicial power.3 0 "Plaintiff's alleged interest in the ques-
tion," he declared in Fairchild v. Hughes,3 1 was only a generalized
public concern and not a claim of specific injury particular to the
plaintiff himself.3 2 Thus, it did not present "a case within the mean-
25 E.g., Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) (rebutting
the presumption of facts sufficient to support exercise of police power same for administra-
tive agencies as for legislatures); Great N. Ry. v. Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291
(1922) (identifying the basis of primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies in the ability
of "a body of experts" to effectively resolve complex fact issues); Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 429-42 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v Solum, 247
U.S. 477, 484 (1918) (expanding the doctrine of primary jurisdiction of administrative agen-
cies). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction originated in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton
Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907); see also UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT,
supra note 5, at 189-91; Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1042
(1964); G. Edward White, Allocating Power Between Agencies and Courts: The Legacy of
Justice Brandeis, 1974 DUKE L.J. 195, 207-08 (1974).
26 PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, at 120-24;
Paul A. Freund, Introduction to BICKEL, supra note 6, at ch. 1; Preface to BICKEL, supra note
6, at xv-xxi.
27 Melvin 1. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REv. 299,
313 (1985) (emphasis omitted).
28 Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922).
29 E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) ("The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, when-
ever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protec-
tion."). As late as 1938, for example, Justice George Sutherland continued to assume that
standing was a requirement based not on Article III but on the common law. LEE, supra note
23, at 77.
3 Fairchild, 258 U.S. at 129.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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ing of [S]ection 2 of [A]rticle [III] of the Constitution." 3 3 As Evan
Tsen Lee noted in his study of the standing doctrine, "[n]o previous
decision had attributed a plaintiff s ineligibility to go forward to Arti-
cle lII." 34 Subsequently the idea took hold, and the Court has come to
hold consistently that injury is a core constitutional component of the
standing required to bring an action in the federal courts. 3 5
Brandeis advanced his ideas of judicial restraint in many
opinions3 6 and ultimately enshrined them most famously in his con-
currence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.37  There, he
pulled together a wide range of disparate cases to advance the sweep-
ing proposition that, as a matter of both principle and practice, the
"[t]he Court .. . has avoided passing upon a large part of all the con-
stitutional questions pressed upon it for decision."3 8 In doing so, he
framed seven avoidance rules that would bar the federal judiciary
from reaching many constitutional issues in cases.3 9 Subsequently,
his ideas of judicial restraint and constitutional avoidance became
common currency,4 0 and Justices have repeatedly cited his Ashwan-
der principles in urging the Court to refuse to decide constitutional
issues.4 1
33 Id.
34 LEE, supra note 23, at 40. Earlier decisions had referred to the Article [Il case or con-
troversy limits on the federal judicial power, but they had focused on elements other than
injury to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911) (explain-
ing the term case in Article M "implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties,
whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication"); Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry.
Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. 40, 46-48
(1851) (noting federal judicial power does not extend to claims subject to final review by
executive official).
35 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
36 See, e.g., King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 115-16 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 565 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 72, 74-75 (1922) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
37 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-49, 351, 354-55 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring); Jaffe, supra note 2, at 988 ("[T]he Ashwander case is a locus classicus ofju-
dicial abstention.").
38 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
40 For invocations of his avoidance principles, see, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
122-24 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (urging the importance of constitutional avoidance);
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318-20 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a
formal avoidance doctrine inspired by Brandeis' views, see R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). For an analysis of the avoidance doctrines, see generally Li-
sa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1003 (1994).
41 Due to divisions on the merits, Justices often cite Brandeis' Ashwander concurrence
while disagreeing on the applicability of its avoidance doctrines. E.g., United States v.
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While Brandeis advocated numerous doctrines of judicial re-
straint, he also pressed the Court in another and quite opposite direc-
tion, one that ultimately helped establish a far different and more as-
sertive judicial power. World War I and the issue of free speech
proved the catalysts.4 2 Although Brandeis joined a unanimous bench
in upholding government prosecutions under the Sedition and Espio-
nage Acts in early 1919,43 he quickly began to rethink his position
and by the end of the year broke sharply from the majority.4 4 First,
he joined Holmes's ringing dissent in Abrams v. United States 45 that
attempted to transform the Court's recently announced, but flaccidly
applied, "clear and imminent danger" test into a significant limitation
on governmental power.4 6 Then, the very next year he struck out on
his own, writing three bold dissents that rejected repressive govern-
ment actions, two by the federal government under the Espionage Act
and one under a state statute that prohibited interference with military
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697-99 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majori-
ty's refusal of avoidance and urging the use of the doctrine); Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct.
2020, 2044 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's refusal of avoid-
ance and urging the use of the doctrine); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,
14-18 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (urging the use of the avoidance doctrine and insist-
ing that the majority reaching the constitutional decision was unnecessary); Webster v. Re-
prod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532-33, 535-37 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion and reasoning on avoidance while urging the Court
to reach the issue presented in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 413 (1973)); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 158-59, 163-67 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagree-
ing with majority's refusal of avoidance and urging the use of the doctrine); Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (urging a constitutional decision on the
merits).
42 Philippa Strum, Brandeis: The Public Activist and Freedom of Speech, 45 BRANDEIS
L.J. 659, 660 (2007) (suggesting that Brandeis' commitment to free speech grew in part out
of his early reform experiences where open debates on controversial issues proved "crucial
to his success").
43 See generally Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. U.S., 249 U.S.
204 (1919); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
1 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 631 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, noting
Brandeis' concurrence with the dissent).
45 250 U.S. 616.
46 Id. at 627-28 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In a unanimous opinion written by Holmes, the
Court articulated its "clear and present danger" test in the first of its World War I First
Amendment cases. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52. For a discussion of the role Holmes and Brande-
is played in developing doctrines that gave greater protection to speech, see generally DAVID
M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 342-80 (1997). For the ways in which
Brandeis moved beyond Holmes and toward a broader theory of First Amendment protec-
tions, see generally Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America's
"First Freedom, " 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557 (1999); Pnina Lahav, Holmes
and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifications for Free Speech, 4 J. L. & POL. 451
(1988).
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recruiting.47 In each he sought to strengthen the "clear and present
danger" test as a limit on governmental power and insisted on the
paramount social and political importance of free speech.4 8  That
right was invaluable, he maintained in Gilbert v. Minnesota,4 9 sound-
ing his most fundamental Progressive values, because it protected
freedom of thought, "the privacy and freedom of the home," and the
"right of free men" to employ reason and public discussion "to strive
for better conditions through new legislation and new institutions.""o
Of even greater long-range importance, his dissent suggested that at
least some parts of the Bill of Rights should be incorporated into the
concept of liberty in the Due Process Clause and thereby made bind-
ing on the states." He urged that proposition more forcefully as the
years went by,52 and decades later that proposition became a funda-
47 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482-84 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce
v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 270-73 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at
334-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Urofsky, Brandeis-Frankfurter, supra note 27, at
323-24 (explaining that in the early 1920s Brandeis confided to Frankfurter that he had
"never been quite happy" about agreeing with the Court's first free speech decisions, when
he had "thought at the subject, not through it. Not until [he] came to write the Pierce [&]
Schaefer cases did [he] understand it.").
48 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482-84 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce, 252 U.S. at 270-73
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
49 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
5o Pierce, 252 U.S. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 335 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 124 (1993) ("The Gilbert
dissent nonetheless laid the foundation for a major alteration of American law and for a reas-
sessment of political values."); accord UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 5, at 177-78. Recognizing the extent to which he was breaking new ground, Brandeis
wrote Frankfurter asking that he and Zechariah Chafee, another Harvard Law Professor, re-
view his Gilbert dissent to see if there was "any flaw in the reasoning in the dissent." Letter
from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 16, 1920), in "HALF BROTHER, HALF
SON": THE LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 53 (Melvin I. Urofsky &
David W. Levy, eds., 1991) [hereinafter HALF BROTHER]. Earlier in the year, Chafee had
published a book entitled Freedom of Speech that was highly critical of the government's
suppression of speech during the war. Lynne Wilson, Book Review: Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Defender of Liberty and Law by Donald L. Smith, 11 U. OF PUGET SOUND L. REv. 387
(1988).
5' Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 336 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis seemed to pull back from
this contention when he wrote later in his Gilbert dissent that his views were based on the
idea of the privileges and immunities of citizens. Id. at 337-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The case presented "no occasion to consider whether [the Minnesota statute] violates also
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). He nonetheless seemed to
make it clear that, if the issue were presented, he would hold that the statute also violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
52 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[A]ll fun-
damental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution
from invasion by the states.").
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mental constitutional principle that would underlie sweeping changes,
transform the law of civil liberties, and substantially broaden the con-
stitutional rights of all Americans.5 3
By the early 1920s Brandeis began to suggest more pointedly
that the protections of due process should extend beyond property
rights to include all "things that are fundamental."5 4 In 1923, break-
ing with Holmes and many Progressives, he joined the Court's opin-
ion in Meyer v. Nebraska" and accepted the proposition that due pro-
cess included a substantive component that protected family
autonomy rights.5 6 Two years later, this time with Holmes coming
along, he joined the Court in reaffirming Meyer and holding that
Fourteenth Amendment liberty included the rights of parents and
guardians "to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control."" The same year he joined Holmes dissent in Gitlow v.
New York 8 and declared that "the general principle of free speech"
was "included in the Fourteenth Amendment."5 9 Six years later, after
repeatedly urging greater protections for free press, 60 he joined Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes' opinion for a bare five-Justice majori-
ty in Near v. Minnesota6 1 and held that freedom of the press was also
5 MELVIN 1. UROFSKY, The Brandeis Agenda, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA, supra note 12,
at 135 ("For it was Brandeis who pointed the way in the most important jurisprudential de-
velopment of this century, the application of the Bill of Rights to the states by incorporating
its provisions through the Fourteenth Amendment."); accord UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE
SUPREME COURT, supra note 5, at 179.
5 Urofsky, Brandeis-Frankfurter, supra note 27, at 320; see also Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 343
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property."); Whitney, 274 U.S. at
373 ("Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the
[F]ederal Constitution from invasion by the States. The right of free speech, the right to
teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights.").
55 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396 (1923).
56 The Court voided a state law that prohibited the teaching of a foreign language in pri-
mary schools by stretching the liberty that due process protected to include educational and
parental rights that were "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. at
399. For the opposition of Progressives, including Frankfurter, to Meyer, see GERALD
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 377-78 (1994).
57 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down a defacto anti-
Catholic state statute).
5 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by
Brandeis, J.).
59 Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
60 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482, 494-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United
States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 417 (1921)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
61 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
2017 THE JUDICIAL LEGACY OF LOUIS BRANDEIS
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.62 Three years after that he
joined Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo's concurrence in Hamilton v.
Regents of the University of California63 assuming that First Amend-
ment "religious liberty" was also protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, a proposition that a unanimous Court accepted only six
years later.6 4
As Brandeis expanded his idea of incorporating fundamental
rights, he also moved to develop a more rigorously protective stand-
ard for determining the scope of First Amendment speech rights, an
evolution that culminated in 1927 with his powerful concurrence in
Whitney v. California.6 5 There, he reiterated many of the First
Amendment themes he had developed since 1920 and issued perhaps
the most compelling defense of free speech in the Court's history. 6 6
First, he based his defense of free speech on a sweeping principle. 6 7
The "rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental," and "all
fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by
the [F]ederal Constitution." 68  Second, he rooted that constitutional
principle in the values of free and open democratic government.69
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in
the power of free and fearless reasoning applied
through the processes of popular government, no dan-
ger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and pre-
sent, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so
62 Id, at 722-23. In 1936, Brandeis joined the Court in affirming the right of freedom of
the press under the Fourteenth Amendment. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-
44 (1936); see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-370 (1931) (affirming the
right of free speech against the strictures of a state criminal syndicalism statute).
63 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
6 Id. at 265 (Cardozo, J., concurring, joined by Brandeis and Stone, JJ.); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Brandeis had left the Court the year before Cantwell
was decided.
65 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). The case involved a conviction under the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act statute, which made it a crime to help organize or join
any group that taught or advocated the use of "unlawful acts of force and violence" as a
means of promoting "political change." Id. at 359-60. Brandeis concurred in the judgment
affirming the conviction on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Id. at 380; see PH1LtPPA STRUM, SPEAKING FREELY: WHITNEY V. CALIFORNIA AND AMERICAN
FREE SPEECH 113-14 (2015).
66 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civil Courage: The
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. Calfornia, WM. & MARY L. REv. 653, 681 (1988).
67 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 377-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity
for full discussion.7 0
Third, he advocated an extremely demanding version of the "clear
and present danger" test.7 1 "The fact that speech is likely to result in
some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression," he declared. 72  "There must be the probability of seri-
ous injury to the State."73 In testament to his teaching, the Court in
1969 adopted a similarly stringent test protecting free speech and ex-
plicitly overruled the majority opinion in Whitney that Brandeis had
so forcefully challenged.74
On a parallel course, he also inspired an expansion of Fourth
Amendment protections. 75  As he had reacted against governmental
repression of free speech and political dissent during and after World
War I, so he grew increasingly disturbed during the 1920s by gov-
7 Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). He continued:
If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies,
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify re-
pression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with
freedom.
Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
11 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374.
72 Id. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
1 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring). Brandeis continued:
Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly are al-
leged to have been invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to pre-
sent the issue whether there actually did exist at the time a clear danger,
whether the danger, if any, was imminent, and whether the evil appre-
hended was one so substantial as to justify the stringent restriction inter-
posed by the Legislature. The legislative declaration, like the fact that
the statute was passed and was sustained by the highest court of the
State, creates merely a rebuttable presumption that these conditions have
been satisfied.
Id. at 378-379 (Brandeis, J., concurring). He rephrased the standard at several points, each
stressing the narrow and demanding conditions that must be met before the government
could restrict First Amendment rights. Id. at 373-74, 376-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
74 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969). Brandeis' "lasting contribution to
democracy itself is the towering opinion he wrote in Whitney" which has "informed all dis-
cussions of free speech since." UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 641. See,
e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (quoting Brandeis' Whitney concur-
rence in arguing for the central importance of free speech to democratic government); see
Blasi, supra note 66, at 682-84.
7 UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 618. Had Brandeis written nothing but
Olmstead and Whitney, "his impact on American constitutional law would still have been
great." Id.
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ernment abuses in enforcing Prohibition.7 6 Although he supported
vigorous police efforts that he recognized as reasonable and neces-
sary,77 as the decade lengthened he became ever more determined to
stop what he regarded as enforcement excesses. He sought to have
the Attorney General curb the Federal Bureau of Investigation's of-
fensive and sometimes unlawful tactics 78 and protested the govern-
ment's use of undercover spies. 79 Privately deploring "the horrors of
official inquisitorial methods,"" he believed that the nation's police
and prosecutorial practices "carry us back to the age of torture."81
Dissenting from the bench, he criticized government officers for en-
trapping defendants and chastised judges for showing an excessive
"zeal to punish."8 2 Sometimes, too, his views prevailed. In 1924, he
wrote for a unanimous Court holding that brutal and protracted inter-
rogation methods rendered a confession inadmissible, 8 3 and three
6 E.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1924); see also Letter from
Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 15, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at
231-32; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 23, 1926), in HALF
BROTHER, supra note 50, at 232; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (June
23, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 242-43; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Fe-
lix Frankfurter (Feb. 4, 1927), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 272; Letter from Louis D.
Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 4, 1928), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 350;
UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 627.
7 Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence ofthe American Administra-
tive States: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 10 (2006) [herein-
after Post, Federalism]. Brandeis joined the Court in several decisions strengthening law-
enforcement efforts. E.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (holding that state
and federal governments were separate sovereignties, and hence that Double Jeopardy
Clause did not bar separate and subsequent prosecution); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925) (holding that automobile search did not require a warrant if officers met a rela-
tively undemanding probable cause standard).
78 UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 627.
79 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 4, 1927), in HALF BROTHER,
supra note 50, at 272 (calling for "the needed investigation of the government prostitutes-
sometimes called spies, and euphemistically known as detectives, inspectors, special agents
& intelligence officers"). See Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 15,
1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 231-32; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix
Frankfurter (Feb. 23, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 232-33; Letter from Louis
D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (June 23, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 242-
43.
80 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 28, 1927), in HALF BROTHER,
supra note 50, at 308-09; see LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY OF ONE
OF AMERICA'S TRULY GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 309-10 (1983).
81 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 4, 1928), in HALF BROTHER,
supra note 50, at 350-51.
82 Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 421-25 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
83 Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1924).
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years later in Gambino v. United States84 he wrote for the Court in
broadening the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule."
Most famously, in 1928 Brandeis issued his ringing dissent in
Olmstead v. United States,86 denouncing the federal government's
use of wire-tapping as a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments.87 In conducting their investigation, federal officers had vio-
lated a state's anti-wiretapping law, and their crime became the gov-
ernment's crime when the United States Department of Justice
"sought . . . to avail itself of the fruits of these acts in order to accom-
plish its own ends."88 In that case the government "assumed moral
responsibility for the officers' crimes" and itself became "a law-
breaker."89 Could the Court, Brandeis asked, "sanction such conduct
on the part of the executive?""o He flatly rejected the possibility.
"Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government offi-
cials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are com-
mands to the citizen."91 Here, too, Brandeis' separate opinion had a
far-reaching impact, as the Court soon began moving toward his posi-
tion and eventually limited and then effectively overruled the majori-
ty's opinion in Olmstead.92
Finally, Brandeis pointed the way toward what initially be-
came the idea of "preferred freedoms" and then the more enduring
idea that the judiciary had a special duty to protect both fundamental
rights and "discrete and insular minorities."93 In the spring of 1936
84 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
" Id. at 312, 314, 317.
86 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
1 Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
91 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Privately, Brandeis saw Olmstead
as another example of the Court's social biases. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix
Frankfurter (June 15, 1928), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 333 ("1 suppose some re-
viewer of the wire-tapping decision will discern that in favor of property the Constitution is
liberally construed-in favor of liberty, strictly.").
92 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (interpreting federal statute broadly
to hold evidence resulting from illegal wiretaps inadmissible in federal prosecutions); Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (concurring on the ground that the majority opinion
overrules Olmstead sub silentio); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (explain-
ing that the Olmstead trespass analysis is no longer controlling).
93 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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he concurred alone in St. Joseph Stock Yard Co. v. United States 94
and proclaimed the existence of a pivotal distinction. The Constitu-
tion not only protected all fundamental liberty rights, he declared, but
it also afforded some of those individual liberty rights greater protec-
tion than it accorded others.95 The Court, he declared boldly, "has
weighed the relative values of constitutional rights" and placed some
of them-including First Amendment rights-above the rights of
property.9 6 Two years later he joined Justice Harlan F. Stone's fa-
mous opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co.97 and creat-
ed another bare majority for the far-reaching proposition that Brande-
is had suggested as early as 1920, that issues impinging on free
speech, fundamental rights, and the proper functioning of democratic
processes should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. 9 8
Were I attempting to evaluate Brandeis's judicial legacy, I
would of course have to consider what his many critics have identi-
fied as the flaws and failures in his jurisprudence. Brandeis has been
charged with holding deeply misguided economic ideas, for example,
and he has been repeatedly attacked as being too political, too activ-
ist, and too result-oriented.99 Indeed, what some people regard as his
94 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring).
9 Id. at 77-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
6 Id. at 73, 77, 81 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Two years earlier Brandeis had joined Rob-
erts's dissent, with Sutherland and Butler, in a 5-4 decision in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 123 (1934), arguing that due process included the right of a criminal defendant to be
present at all phases of a trial, including a view. Id. at 127-29. There, Roberts distinguished
between due process protection of property, which covered only "actual injury," and of fair
"procedure in the courts," which guaranteed not merely "a just result" but also "that the re-
sult, whatever, it be, shall be reached in a fair way." Id. at 137 ((Roberts, J., dissenting).
97 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
98 Id. at 152 n.4. Stone cited Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney in support of the proposi-
tion that free speech was critical to the democratic political process. Id. For Brandeis' early
opinions suggesting such heightened scrutiny, see Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253,
273 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334, 337-38
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For the short-lived "preferred" freedom idea, see, e.g.,
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (proclaiming the "preferred place" of First
Amendment rights and citing Carolene Products Co. in support).
99 E.g., WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 3, at 145-46 "When the
insights generated by an inquiry into facts harmonized with his own predilections, conclu-
sions became irresistible. Once he had drawn conclusions, he was not particularly tolerant of
opposing views, nor terribly anxious, as a judge, to allow them much weight." WHITE, THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 3, 171. "Brandeis was the crusader. No less
than McReynolds, on the far side of the fence, did Brandeis seek to write his own economic
ideas into law." FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES FROM 1790 TO 1955 227 (1955). See PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE
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"most famous opinion,"'00 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,'01 has been
subject to extensive and severe criticism, some of it surely warrant-
ed.' 0 2  One prominent scholar has even argued that Erie was not
merely "wrong" but "pernicious" and that it stands out in the Court's
long history as "the Worst Decision of all Time." 0 3 This is perhaps
hyperbole.
In any event my purpose is neither to evaluate Brandeis' judi-
cial legacy nor to assess the arguments of his critics and defenders. It
is, rather, to consider what his career teaches about the nature of
American constitutionalism. With that in mind, I turn not to what his
critics have said but to the other side of his legacy coin, to the issues
and areas where Brandeis' ideas have been ignored, discarded, or
flatly rejected-in other words to the cast-offs from his judicial lega-
cy.1 0 4
IH. BRANDEIS'S JUDICIAL LEGACY: THE CAST-OFFs
Most arresting is Brandeis' private belief in the early 1920s
that the Fourteenth Amendment should be repealed.' Today, of
course, that amendment stands unchallenged as a central pillar of
modern American constitutional law. While his belief was under-
standable in the context of his time and his political views, this par-
ticular Brandeisian idea now seems wholly wrong-headed, potentially
catastrophic, and surely dead and buried.
Equally dead and buried are the assumptions that supported
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, at 124-32.
100 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 65 (1990).
101 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
102 The decision was "terribly misguided." Craig Green, Can Erie Survive as Federal
Common Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813, 833 (2013). For criticisms, see, e.g.,
MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE DowN CONSTITUTION ch. 10 (2012); PURCELL,
ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 155-64.
103 Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out ofStep, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision ofAll
Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129 (2011).
10 All the great figures in American constitutional history have suffered their cast-offs.
Alexander Hamilton, for example, argued that Congress could make federal questions exclu-
sive to the federal courts, a rule that holds today, but he also maintained that the federal
courts could review state court decisions, a position that was quickly rejected. Similarly,
Chief Justice John Marshall held in Marbury that Congress cannot increase the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction, which remains good law, but his contention in the same opinion
that Congress could not alter the Court's original jurisdiction has been rejected in favor of
allowing Congress to shift cases within that jurisdiction to the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
5 U.S. at 138, 174. On various issues, all the great Justices have suffered similar fates.
105 Urofsky, Brandeis-Frankfurter, supra note 27, at 325.
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Brandeis' faith in Prohibition.1 06 His commitment to that disastrous
"social experiment" was intense on both the personal 07 and the judi-
cial'08 level. Today, such assumptions and such a commitment seem
naive in the extreme and wholly out of accord with contemporary
views and values.
Other typically Brandeisian ideas seem largely pass6.10 9
Brandeis' faith in science, expert administration, and government
regulation seems, at a minimum, excessively optimistic. The fre-
quency of agency capture, the "revolving door" between regulators
and regulated, and much disappointing practical experience have
combined to chasten hopes and expectations. Contemporary com-
mentators, even if still hopeful, are commonly more skeptical, while
many have become deeply hostile to administrative agencies.110
Along similar lines, Brandeis' determined opposition to "big-
ness" in all its forms, a repeated theme in his writings,"' appears tan-
gential if not irrelevant to the pervasively centralized structural con-
ditions of modem life. So, too, his deep hostility to corporations,
another major element in his thinking.11 2 Although resentments
10 UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 626.
107 Although Brandeis "liked his beer and an occasional whiskey," he and his wife Alice
"came to believe that the abolition of strong drink could be in the national interest."
UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 621, 625. Accordingly, Brandeis' personal
views and behavior changed during Prohibition. "As Brandeis grew older, the ascetic streak
in him strengthened, and he and Alice had no problem eliminating beer, wine, and whiskey
from their household." UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 625.
108 "Brandeis's commitment to upholding prohibition and federal enforcement authority"
exhibited a "breathtaking intensity." Post, Federalism, supra note 77, at 137 n.45 1. See gen-
erally Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926); Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920);
Nat'l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251
U.S. 146 (1919); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921 532-35 (1984).
109 Many of Brandeis' ideas "seem in retrospect quaint." POSNER, CARDOZO, supra note
100, at 140. Given the breadth of Brandeis' jurisprudence and the values he appealed to-
democracy, freedom, localism, etc.-many elements of his jurisprudence remain perennials
and others are periodically revived. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal
Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 186-90 (1996).
110 E.g., STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 335 (referring to "Brandeis's
belief that unlimited human advancement can be furthered by legislation."). Brandeis' faith
was, however, hardly naive. In 1922, for example, he warned a friend not to "pin too much
faith in legislation" for aquite modem reason. "Remedial institutions are apt to fall under the
control of the enemy and to become instruments of oppression." Letter from Louis D.
Brandeis to Robert Walter Bruere (Feb. 25, 1922), in V LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 45
(Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1978).
' E.g., Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
112 E.g., Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 404 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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against both "bigness" and corporations remain alive, they have al-
most completely lost legal and constitutional salience. Even during
Brandeis' lifetime, his attitudes on those subjects seemed unusual if
not extreme,113 and since his retirement national corporations have
not only become ever more deeply embedded in American life but,
more recently, ever more solicitously protected by the Supreme
Court.114
Worse, some of Brandeis' judicial actions have been discard-
ed and now seem flatly unacceptable. Few would defend his decision
to join Holmes' opinion in Buck v. Bell' upholding a state law re-
quiring sterilization of "feeble-minded" institutionalized persons.1 16
Indeed, only three fleeting years after Brandeis retired a unanimous
Court in effect rejected the opinion he had joined and held a similar
state law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.1 17
Equally striking, commentators have severely criticized and often
condemned his extensive political involvements while he was on the
bench. There seems to be a general agreement that those extra-
judicial efforts were at a minimum disingenuous if not improper and
that, even if not clearly wrong in his day, are most likely unethical
under contemporary standards of judicial conduct."'
113 Louis GALAMBOS & BARBARA BARROW SPENCE, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF BIG BUSINESS
IN AMERICA, 1880-1940: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY IN SOCIAL CHANGE 18 (1975) (arguing that
even many Progressives had come to see large-scale corporate enterprise as consistent with
their values).
114 See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Saved by the Supreme Court: Rescuing Corporate Ameri-
ca, AM. CONST. SoC'Y FOR LAW AND POL'Y I (Oct. 2011),
https://www.asclaw.org/sites/default/files/Morrison_- Savedby-theSupremeCourt.pdf;
Lee Epstein, William M. Landis, & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme
Court, 97 MINN. L. REv. 1431, 1431-32 (2013); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular
to the General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 1738-47 (2014).
"I Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
116 Id. at 205.
H7 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). Indicative of the way that such out-
moded decisions are frequently ignored, Melvin Urofsky's massive biography of Brandeis
relegates Buck to a footnote describing the case in the briefest terms and noting only that it
"is now considered" a "notorious opinion." UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at
874.
"I Brandeis' most recent and highly sympathetic biographer concluded that Brandeis
"maintained a level of extrajudicial activity that, by current standards of judicial ethics,
would be either impermissible or at best questionable in judgment." UROFSKY, Louis D.
BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 460. For an indictment of Brandeis' behavior in this regard, see
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES OF Two SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1982), and for a defense, see Robert Cover,
The Framing of Justice Brandeis, THE NEW REPUBLIC 17 (May 5, 1982). For a review of
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Even on First Amendment issues, constitutional law has
moved well beyond Brandeis' emphasis on the instrumental and rela-
tively narrow political grounds for upholding free speech. For
Brandeis, the First Amendment served primarily to protect democrat-
ic government and the right of citizens to engage in serious public
discourse."' By the late twentieth century, however, the Court was
relying on the First Amendment to protect new and far wider catego-
ries of "self-expressive" speech and behavior, including nude danc-
ing1 2 0 and graphic sexual materials,121 subjects that would surely have
shocked Brandeis and struck him as far outside the First Amend-
ment's scope and purpose.
Further, many of the Court's more recent decisions expanding
the scope of corporate speech rights exceed drastically the limits
Brandeis would have welcomed. 12 2 True, he joined the Court in us-
ing the First Amendment to protect newspaper corporations from
special taxes directed against the press, 123 but that decision was lim-
ited to publishing companies that, in his view, served a special demo-
cratic purpose in educating the electorate. 12 4 The Court's more recent
expansions of corporate speech rights would surely have struck
Brandeis as serving that function poorly or not at all. "The sort of
'advocacy' of which Mr. Justice Brandeis spoke," then-Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist noted while dissenting in a corporate speech case in
1980, "was not the advocacy on the part of a utility to use more of its
some of the literature on the issue, see G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and
Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 576, 610-16 (1996).
119 Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 273 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
120 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975).
121 E.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491 (1985); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S.
153 (1974). For a far broader view of that nature and function of free speech than Brandeis
held, see, e.g., NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE
FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995).
122 E.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Most like-
ly, Brandeis would have joined the dissent by Justice White that was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 802 (White, J., dissenting). For recent developments, see, e.g.,
Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional
Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1673 (2015); Elizabeth M. Silvestri, Free Speech, Free
Press, Free Religion? The Clash Between the Affordable Care Act and the For-Profit Secu-
lar Corporation, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 257 (2015).
123 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245, 248 (1936).
124 Id. at 249-50.
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product."1 25
First Amendment law has moved even farther from Brandeis'
jurisprudence in other ways as well. The Court's recent decisions in-
validating laws restricting campaign funding by corporations and, es-
pecially, its decision to adopt the narrowest possible definition of
"corruption," contradict Brandeis' views on both the desirability of
regulating campaign financing and the acute danger of political cor-
ruption. 126  Similarly, the Court's recent efforts to turn constitutional
and statutory protections for religion into grounds for defeating both
general social welfare measures and the legal rights of third persons
are inconsistent with his views. 127 In spite of his support for incorpo-
rating the First Amendment religious clauses into the Fourteenth
Amendment, Brandeis would have seen the rights they conferred as
more limited and unable to restrict the general regulatory powers of
the federal government in social and economic matters. 128
Race is an even more obvious area where both popular atti-
tudes and constitutional law have changed radically and consigned
yet more parts of Brandeis' jurisprudence to the distant past. In
125 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 583, 595
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
126 McCutcheon v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014); Citizens United
v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010).
127 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762-64 (2014) (exempting on
statutory grounds closely-held corporations from obligations under the Affordable Care Act).
On the current Court's use of the First Amendment to defeat federal economic regulation and
social programs, see Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 Wisc. L. REv. 133, 136
(2016). The interpretation of the religion clauses has generally changed as religious align-
ments and political coalitions have changed over the decades. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr.
& James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279,
281-82 (2001). For current efforts of right-wing Christian groups to use the First Amend-
ment, especially the free speech clause to shape public education, see KATHERINE STEWART,
THE GOOD NEWS CLUB: THE CHRISTIAN RIGrr's STEALTH ASSAULT ON AMERICA'S CHILDREN
81, 83, 85 (2012).
128 Brandeis joined Cardozo's concurrence in Hamilton which assumed that the religion
clauses of the First Amendment were incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. 293 U.S.
at 265. The opinion, however, stressed that the Free Exercise Clause did not exempt indi-
viduals from normal obligations of the law. "Never in our history has the notion been ac-
cepted, or even, it is believed, advanced, that acts thus indirectly related to [military] ser-
vice . . . are so tied to the practice of religion as to be exempt, in law or in morals, from
regulation by the state." Id. at 267. See, e.g., Patrick J. McNulty & Adam D. Zenor, Corpo-
rate Free Exercise of Religion and the Interpretation of Congressional Intent: Where Will It
End?, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 477-78, 482-83 (2015); see generally Elizabeth Sepper, Free-
Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1453 (2015). Similarly, Brandeis would likely
have strongly opposed the Court's recent use of the First Amendment to trump the Estab-
lishment Clause. See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995); Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001).
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Grovey v. Townsend,129 for example, Brandeis joined the Court in
upholding the right of the Texas Democratic Party to hold an "all
white" primary, a decision that the Court overruled only five years
after he left the bench.13 0 More striking, in both Gong Lum v. Ricel31
and South Covington & Cincinnati Street Railway Co. v. Kentucky1 32
Brandeis joined opinions reaffirming the "separate-but-equal" doc-
trine then enshrined in the now-scorned case of Plessy v. Ferguson.13 3
In Gong Lum, where the Court upheld the right of Mississippi to clas-
sify a young Chinese girl as "colored" and require her to attend a seg-
regated black school, Brandeis stood with the Court.1 34 More telling,
in South Covington, where a majority upheld a law requiring racial
segregation on an interstate rail line, 135 three Justices did dissent,
stressing the uncontested fact that the railway line in question crossed
state lines. 13 6 Even given that interstate context and a dissenting co-
hort of three other Justices, Brandeis still chose to stay with Plessy.137
In sharp contrast to the passionate dissents he issued in Gilbert,
Olmstead, and so many other cases, he simply went along in race
cases and remained silent.13 8
129 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 47 (1935).
130 Id. at 47; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
131 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
132 S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 252 U.S. 399 (1920).
'3 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 330-35.
134 Gong Lum, 275 U.S. at 87.
135 S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 252 U.S. at 404.
136 "There is no conflict of testimony, and the record shows that the company was en-
gaged in the operation of a street railway system whose principal business was interstate
commerce, carrying passengers between Cincinnati and Kentucky cities across the Ohio
River." Id. at 405 (Day, J., dissenting).
13 In fairness, in a few cases Brandeis joined the Court in providing some protection for
minorities. Those cases, however, not only had the support of a majority of the other Justic-
es but they also involved either utterly indefensible abuses or laws that discriminated explic-
itly on the basis of race. E.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 89 (1923) (writing for seven
Justices, Holmes reversed convictions of blacks subject to outrageously unfair trials); Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 285 (1922) (holding unanimously that two Chinese immi-
grants claiming U.S. citizenship could not be deported without a due process hearing on the
fact of their alleged citizenship). By narrowing the focus and ignoring a great deal, Urofsky
put the issue in the most positive light. "All told, in nearly all the major cases involving Af-
rican-Americans in which he took part, Brandeis and a majority of the Court upheld the
black petitioners." UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 639. For an example of
some of the complexities in the race cases Brandeis participated in, see, e.g., Spillenger,
Reading the Judicial Canon, supra note 2, at 14748.
13 Christopher A. Bracey, Louis Brandeis and the Race Question, 52 ALA. L. REv. 859,
895 (2001) ("Brandeis' judicial record on racial issues pales in comparison with his demon-
strated commitment to civil and economic liberties" and "evinces a conscious avoidance of
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Born and raised in mid-nineteenth century Kentucky, Brande-
is had seemingly absorbed the views of most white Southerners of the
day, racial views that few Progressives subsequently wished to chal-
lenge.' 3 9 Whatever the explanation for his racial jurisprudence, how-
ever,'4 0 it is clear that Brandeis failed to use his judicial position to
press for significant changes and that he accepted and enforced
Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine.14 1 Thus, his jurisprudence in
this area is far distant from contemporary views and contrary to the
constitutional law that developed in the decades after Brown v. Board
ofEducation.14
If a bit less obvious, Brandeis' views on gender equality seem
equally outdated. Although he came to support women's suffrage
and the opening of some new opportunities for women,1 43 his views
were far from those that became common in the later twentieth centu-
ry. Assuming a dominant role in his marriage, he retained many tra-
the race question (whenever such avoidance was possible) and a certain complicity in the
continued subjugation of American blacks.")). Brandeis' record was "disappointing with
regard to the rights of black and Asian citizens and resident aliens." STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE
PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 330.
139 UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 20, 640. In one of his private letters
Brandeis attributed a view he scorned, that scientific truth could be determined by a vote, to
a "darky preacher." Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 12, 1935), in
HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 563-64. Whatever its impact, Brandeis' Kentucky up-
bringing was apparently relatively liberal compared with the upbringing of most white
Southerners. BASKERVILLE, supra note 24, at 53-56.
140 Baskerville suggests that Brandeis "remained silent" on matters of racial justice be-
cause "open advocacy of so unpopular a cause would prove to be the graveyard of his cam-
paigning reputation." BASKERVILLE, supra note 24, at 286. Strum suggests more legalistical-
ly that Brandeis' race-related decisions may have been rooted in "[r]espect for state
sovereignty and federalism." STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 334. For
suggestions about other possible motives, see Bracey, supra note 138, at 905-09.
141 "Neither the social contract [that Brandeis advocated] in the political sphere nor his
proposed economic contract was addressed to the problem of status, equality, and the possi-
bility of self-fulfillment in a society whose governmental and private institutions reflected an
ideology of racism and sexism." STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50,
at 164. On the widespread racial bias in the United States and on the Supreme Court itself in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly
Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and "Federal
Courts, " 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927,2001-38 (2003).
142 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
143 See, e.g., STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50, at 163. Brandeis,
for example, made a special personal appeal to President Franklin Roosevelt to appoint
Frances Perkins to the cabinet. Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and His Clerks, 49 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REv. 163, 181 (2010). When the president did so, Brandeis explained that
Perkins was "the best" and that it was "a distinct advance to have selected a woman for the
Cabinet." Id.
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ditional and constrictive ideas about gender roles.1 44 Unlike his focus
on the facts of industrial society and the practical problems of work-
ers, for example, he gave little heed to the social and economic facts
that undergirded structures of gender inequality.1 45 Again, unlike the
attention he gave to implementing other reforms, he gave scant atten-
tion to the practical problems involved in actually achieving gender
equality in practice. 4 6  "Brandeis seems to have assumed that suf-
frage would be a sufficient condition for true gender equality," 47
Philippa Strum wrote, and he did not consider "how or whether one
got into the workplace in the first instance."1 48 Whether one sees his
eponymous brief in Muller v. Oregon 49 as marking Brandeis as a
sexist, a clever advocate, or simply a man of his times, constitutional
law has since discarded the argument that women need special pro-
tective labor legislation because of their destined child-bearing roles
in society.' More broadly, it has accepted the key principle that
laws and practices involving alleged gender discrimination deserve a
stricter form of judicial scrutiny.
Finally, Brandeis' ideas of liberty and fundamental rights did
not include claims for abortion, sexual freedom, or same-sex mar-
riage.' 52 One could suggest, of course, that his emphasis on protect-
'" LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 196 (1983); STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM,
supra note 50, at 163; STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 128-31; UROFSKY,
Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 113, 124-26, 223-27, 365.
145 STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 128-31; UROFSKY, LouIs D.
BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 224, 594-95.
146 UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 223-24.
147 STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM,supra note 50, at 164.
148 STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supranote 50, at 164.
149 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908).
150 Compare id. at 421-23 (upholding special statutory protection for female workers),
with United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-200 (1991) (reject-
ing as discriminatory employer's policy providing special "protection" for female workers).
On issues of gender equality, Brandeis has fairly been described as "a man of his time" and
"a product of his times." STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50, at 164;
UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 364.
'' United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). For earlier decisions suggesting the
need for greater protections against gender discriminations, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
152 Stressing certain of Brandeis' statements and values, one could argue that his jurispru-
dence provides support for such recently recognized rights. E.g., Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (purpose of government "to make men
free to develop their faculties."); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("the right to be let alone" is "the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men."). Justices did on occasion use Brandeis to support
expansions of the right to privacy. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 n.12, 543,
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ing the "privacy and freedom of the home"" 3 and his support for the
Court's decisions in both Meyer and Pierce v. Society of Sisters'5 4
provided some support for the Court's eventual decisions in those ar-
eas. Even granted such a connection as a matter of abstract legal ar-
gument, however, it remains true that Brandeis' own views fell far
short of including-or almost certainly even imagining-that such
matters were among the fundamental rights that the Constitution pro-
tected."' His much different and far narrower view of fundamental
rights is hardly surprising given the fact that during his lifetime the
overwhelming majority of Americans were scandalized by ideas of
sexual freedom and would have scorned the idea of providing consti-
tutional protection for either abortion or same-sex marriage. In the
past half-century, of course, all of those matters have come to receive
constitutional protection. 156
IV. CONTRIBUTIONS, CAST-OFFS, AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Both Brandeis' judicial contributions and his judicial cast-offs
highlight the same fundamental truth. The American Constitution
is-as a matter of indisputable historical fact-a constitution of
change.15 7 Brandeis' enduring contributions to the nation's constitu-
548-59, 551-52 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting & Harlan, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1961) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Such uses were, however,
expansions that Brandeis neither had in mind nor would most likely have accepted. See, e.g.,
Blasi, supra note 66, at 672, 695-96; Farber, supra note 109, at 184-85.
153 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
154 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
155 "It seems fair to conclude that, until recent years, many citizens had not even consid-
ered the possibility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status
and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage." United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
56 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (right to same-sex marriage); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (anti-sodomy law invalid); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(due process right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmarried
people to possess contraception on the same basis as married couples); Griswold, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (right to privacy in sexual matters).
5 Given the facts of constitutional history, "there's no realistic alternative to a living
constitution." DAVID A. STRAUSS, THlE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1 (2010). Indeed, even the
Constitution's fundamental federal structure serves as an instrument of change. See, e.g.,
PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at ch.10; ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF
WAR WITIIN (2011); Heather K. Gerken, Windsor's Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of
Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REv. 587 (2015).
In moments of candor, the Court itself has acknowledged as much. Most famously, Chief
Justice John Marshall explained why a constitution could not properly be filled with innu-
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tional law are rooted in the fact that over the past century Americans
have come to accept and honor many of his ideas and values, while
his cast-offs spotlight the fact that over the same century Americans
have passed over, discarded, or rejected many of his other ideas and
values. Both the contributions and the cast-offs underscore the reali-
ty of constitutional change and illuminate its nature.
A. Brandeis and the Constitution of Change
At the highest authoritative level, members of the Supreme
Court add-even if only by the votes they cast-their own distinctive
inputs to the body of constitutional law and help shape, however
faintly, the prevailing vectors of constitutional change.' We readily
acknowledge, even if unintentionally, that fundamental truth when
we speak of great Justices from Marshall and Story to the present.
We regard Justices as great when they have left a distinct and endur-
ing imprint on the law, narrowing or eliminating older interpretations
and directions while adding new and different ones. We can and do
merable details but should only mark out its "great outlines" and designate its "important
objects." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). All else should be inferred from
those basic guidelines, he reasoned, and those inferences should properly change as circum-
stances and needs changed. Id. at 415. The Constitution, Marshall explained, was "intended
to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." Id. In declaring that poll taxes in state and local elections violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the Court acknowledged that:
[t]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a
particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discrimi-
natory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any
more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what
was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). "Notions of what constitutes
equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change." Id. Similarly, Chief
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the extent to which the Court has infused wholly new
meanings into the Eleventh Amendment when he rejected legal arguments based on its text
as a mere "straw man." Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996). The
Court has adopted change explicitly in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. E.g., Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (amendment construed in light of nation's "evolving
standards of decency.").
158 KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 26 (2004) ("The Court, in short, is a
flashpoint or a crucible. It sits at the center of the conjunctions, multiple orders, and inter-
currences that characterize the American political order, and, aware of its perpetually tenu-
ous claim to authority, a claim based precariously on its status as a law follower rather than a
law creator, labors to reconcile them plausibly in light of concrete, often crosscutting goals
(and often in the absence of them). Only a developmental approach to American constitu-
tionalism can hope to capture these complicated dynamics.").
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argue about the pedigree, propriety, quality, wisdom, and conse-
quences of the changes each made, but we debate those qualities be-
cause each of the great Justices did change the law.
When was the last time you heard a debate about the jurispru-
dence of most of the Justices who sat with Marshall and Story?
Thomas Todd and Gabriel Duvall, for example, or Smith Thompson
and Robert Trimble? Or about some of the Justices who sat with
Field, Miller, and Bradley after the Civil War? William Strong and
Ward Hunt, or William B. Woods and George Shiras? Indeed, when
was the last time you heard a debate about the contributions of many
twentieth-century Justices? Joseph McKenna and Horace Lurton, or
Joseph R. Lamar and Edward Sanford? James Byrnes and Harold
Burton, or Sherman Minton and Charles Whitaker? Each of those
largely overlooked, if not forgotten, Justices shared one characteris-
tic: none left a noteworthy imprint on the Constitution.
One of the many imprints Brandeis left was, in fact, an explic-
it openness about the need for and legitimacy of constitutional
change. "The prohibition contained in the Fifth Amendment refers to
infamous crimes-a term obviously inviting interpretation in harmo-
ny with conditions and opinions prevailing from time to time," he
wrote in United States v. Moreland.159 And the confinement at issue
was allowable, he continued, because it was certainly not infamous
"to-day."1 60 In Olmstead he emphasized that "this Court has repeat-
edly sustained the exercise of power by Congress, under various
clauses of that instrument, over objects of which the [F]athers could
not have dreamed."1 61 Indeed, he praised the Fathers for their em-
brace of change. "Those who won our independence by revolution
were not cowards," he proclaimed. "They did not fear political
change."1 62
Quite explicitly, Brandeis's jurisprudence was a jurisprudence
of change. 163 His characteristic insistence on the necessity of under-
159 United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 451 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 450-51 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
161 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing
Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co, 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North
Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919); Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163 (1919);
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925)).
162 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see
BICKEL, supra note 6, at 151-54.
163 It is worth noting, too, that one of the ironies of Brandeis' legacy is that it highlights
the fact that Brandeis himself changed while on the bench. Strum, Brandeis: The Public Ac-
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standing the facts was designed for that very purpose.
But the cases which have most engaged the attention
of the Court since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the great development of interstate
commerce present no dispute as to the meaning of
words or clauses. They deal with the application of
admitted constitutional limitations to the varying and
illusive facts of life. Life implies growth. Only
change is abiding. In order to reach sound conclusion
in such cases, we must strive ceaselessly to bring our
opinions into agreement with the facts ascertained. 16 4
The other characteristic elements of his jurisprudence served
the same goal. His justification for free speech, his emphasis on the
promise of science and expertise, his insistence on the importance of
experimentation, and his image of the states as laboratories were all
parts of the same coherent vision. Thus, for example, he not only
urged courts to follow James Bradley Thayer's highly deferential
"rule of the clear mistake" in order to open more space for legislative
innovations, but in doing so he also expanded the scope of Thayer's
rule by applying it to the review of state as well as to federal legisla-
tion, thus throwing even more doors open for such innovation. 165
There "must be power in [both] the states and the nation" he declared
in his powerful dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,16 6 "to re-
mould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institu-
tions to meet changing social and economic needs."1 67
On a parallel path, Brandeis sought to encourage the Court it-
tivist and Freedom of Speech, supra note 42, at 661-63, 708-09 and passim. His view of na-
tional authority, the First Amendment, judicial restraint, executive power, and the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment all changed during his tenure on the Court.
'4 BICKEL, supra note 6, at 151 (quoting an unpublished draft opinion in Stratton v. St.
Louis Sw. Ry. Co. (1930)).
165 PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 154-55. On Thayer's theory and its reformu-
lation by Brandeis and other Progressive jurists, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Learned Hand:
The Jurisprudential Trajectory ofan Old Progressive, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 873, 884-96 (1995).
166 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Shortly before he became a Justice with the Court
in 1916 Brandeis had forecast those views. The "recent dissatisfaction with our law," he
then declared, was rooted in "the fact that it had not kept pace with the rapid development of
our political, economic and social ideals." Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, in BUSINESS-
A PROFESSION 344, 347 (1933). As a result, he continued, it was essential for lawyers and
judges to study the social and economic world so they could properly and effectively address
"the problems of today." Id. at 362.
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self to make constitutional changes by loosening the grip of stare de-
cisis and thereby encouraging judicial innovation."' Dissenting in
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,169 he maintained that stare deci-
sis was not "a universal inexorable command" but, instead, merely a
matter of "wise policy."' The decision to follow or overrule a prec-
edent was "entirely within the discretion of the court."1 7 1 While it
was generally better to follow precedent or wait for legislative action,
he maintained, "in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where
correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this
Court has often overruled its earlier decisions."l 72 The Court "bows
to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning . .. "173
Not surprisingly, he buttressed his claim with a characteristic asser-
tion: "the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical scienc-
es, is appropriate also in the judicial function." 74  Subsequently the
Court has often invoked that principle, frequently citing yet another
of his opinions that appeared in dissent.1 75
B. Understanding the American Constitution of
Change
As a matter of history, the reality of constitutional change is
undeniable, and one might think that everyone understands and ac-
cepts that fact.1 76  Many, however, bemoan such changes or deny
their legitimacy, and in truth there are serious reasons for that reac-
6 See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 150-52.
16' Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(joined by Stone and Roberts, JJ.).
170 Id. at 405-06 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 5, at 192 (stating that "Brandeis was the first justice to suggest that the
Court not feel completely bound by precedent."). See also LEE, supra note 23, at 39-40;
Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholar-
ship, and Decisionmaking [sic] in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1267, 1351-52 (2001).
171 Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 406-07 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 407-08 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 408 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1' E.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996); Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843, 854-55 (1992) (opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter announcing the judgment of the Court); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828
(1991).
176 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367
(2009); MARK TUSHNET, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 39 (2d ed. 2015).
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tion. 17 7 If the Constitution changes in meaning and application, they
argue, there is little or no point in having a written constitution.1 78 if
the Constitution's meaning and application change, they continue,
there is no guarantee against erratic, subjective, and potentially radi-
cal and destructive changes.179 And those protesters surely have one
undeniable truth in their corner: change does not necessarily mean
change for the better, and it does not necessarily mean "progress,"
however defined. It just means change, and possibly change for the
worse.
Brandeis' justly celebrated concurrence in Olmstead, which
heralded the open nature of many constitutional provisions and the
necessity of adapting them to changing times, illustrates the dan-
ger."' The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Brandeis declared,
"do not forbid the United States or the states from meeting modern
conditions," and those governments could properly meet those "mod-
ern conditions" by enacting laws so innovative that a mere half centu-
ry earlier they "probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive."181 The striking point about that statement is that as au-
thority to support it Brandeis cited Buck v. Bell,'82 the decision he had
joined the prior year upholding the supposedly "modern" idea pro-
moted by the then-prominent eugenics movement that the "feeble-
minded" should be sterilized.' 83 The Court repudiated that decision
" On the complexities of constitutional interpretation and some of the reasons for criti-
cizing theories of change or denying the legitimacy of interpretative change, see generally
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Conclusions, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 321 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006).
178 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402-03 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting)
(stating that "the meaning of the Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of eco-
nomic events. We frequently are told in more general words that the Constitution must be
construed in the light of the present. If by that it is meant that the Constitution is made up of
living words that apply to every new condition which they include, the statement is quite
true. But to say, if that be intended, that the words of the Constitution mean today what they
did not mean when written -- that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which they
would have applied then--is to rob that instrument of the essential element which continues it
in force as the people have made it until they, and not their official agents, have made it oth-
erwise.").
179 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 24 (1985) (stating that "the idea that constitutions must evolve to meet changing
circumstances is an invitation to destroy the rule of law.").
180 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1'8 Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)).
182 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
18 Id. at 207-08. The decision had strong social support at the time, as the eugenics
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shortly after Brandeis left the bench,1 8 4 and it is now widely discred-
ited. The fact that Brandeis cited such a now-rejected decision as
positive support for the desirability of constitutional change and ad-
aptation, however, stands as a stark reminder that the reasons ad-
vanced for change are not always sound, that calls for change are not
always benevolent, and that change itself might well prove unwise
and harmful.
Ultimately, then, there are no guarantees, and there are surely
no guarantees in Brandeis' jurisprudence. "' Those who seek guid-
ance from his legacy are likely to come to different conclusions in
different cases because his jurisprudence-like the Constitution it-
self-incorporates fundamental and irresolvable tensions.1 8 6 Brande-
is' jurisprudence prizes certain values, but it also acknowledges both
that those values have limits and that they may sometimes conflict.
Thus, it urges the courts to both exercise judicial restraint and prac-
tice judicial boldness, to both encourage legislative experimentation
and protect fundamental rights, to both uphold the common good and
safeguard individual liberties, to both defer to actions of other gov-
ernmental institutions and review those actions with exacting scruti-
ny.18 Brandeis' jurisprudence, in other words, highlights enduring
movement was prominent in the United States in the 1920s and claimed many followers, in-
cluding prominent scientists and leading Progressives. See, e.g., Susan Currell, Eugenic De-
cline and Recovery in Self-Improvement Literature of the Thirties, in POPULAR EUGENICS:
NATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND AMERICAN MASS CULTURE IN THE 1930's 44 (Susan Currell &
Christina Cogdell eds., 2006); DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND
THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 97 (1998); THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS:
RACE, EUGENICS AND AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 111-12 (2016); PAUL
A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, No IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
BUCK V. BELL 174 (2008); DONALD PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE PROGRESSIVES (1968); David
A. Bernstein, From Progressivism to Modern Liberalism: Louis D. Brandeis as a Transi-
tional Figure in Constitutional Law, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2029,2036 (2014).
184 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 54243 (1942).
185 Even a Brandeisian reliance on "the facts" provides no guarantees, as "facts" may not
actually be relevant-or even "facts"-and "scientific" theories may be flawed, misapplied,
or simply unfounded. "Brandeis briefs" were used in the early twentieth century, for exam-
ple, to support various forms of racial segregation and discrimination by bringing before the
courts "scientific" evidence of the racial inferiority of blacks and the dangers of race-mixing.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT,
1870-1970 53-55, 66-68 (2015).
116 Brandeis' opinions are understandably cited in support of many arguments in many
cases, but quite commonly the Justices disagreed as to their relevance, weight, and applica-
tion. See, e.g., the cases cited, supra notes 4, 41, 176, 188.
187 In Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens sparred
over the significance of Brandeis' principles in New State, where Brandeis praised the states
as laboratories, and his position in Whitney, where he defended free speech. 530 U.S. 640,
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values, illuminates critical tensions, and illustrates methodical and
fact-based reasoning, but it can settle few if any of the newly pressing
controversies that divide Americans in the present and that will surely
divide them in the future.
If there are no guarantees from Brandeis' jurisprudence, there
are equally no guarantees from anyone else's. Indeed, there are none
from the United States Constitution itself. Thus, we confront the ul-
timate truth: The American Constitution and the vital tradition it has
inspired have combined to offer many guides that limit, channel, and
point, but they ultimately require each generation of Americans to
understand, evaluate, and apply those guides according to their own
best lights in the context of altered conditions and novel challenges.
Most American constitutionalists have accepted the fact of
constitutional change and seek to identify reasonable and authorita-
660-61 (2000). Justice Stevens dissented and invoked New State Ice, while Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the Court, rejected the applicability of New State Ice and invoked Whitney instead. Id.
at 660-61, 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The same conflict between those counterpoised
principles occurred in Chandler v. Miller, in which Justice Ginsburg cited Brandeis' dissent
in Olmstead-to support her majority opinion, while Chief Justice Rehnquist countered by cit-
ing Brandeis' dissent in New State Ice. 520 U.S. 305, 322, 324 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting). In Arizona v. Evans, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority and cited
Brandeis' dissent in New State Ice. 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995). However, Justice Stevens and Jus-
tice Ginsburg dissented separately, with Stevens citing Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead and
Ginsburg citing Brandeis' concurrence in Ashwander. Id. at 18, 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Poe v. Ullman illustrates the inherent tension between Brandeisian activism and Brandeisian
restraint. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) Justice Felix Frankfurter, when considering whether the
plaintiffs had a fundamental right to contraceptives under the Due Process Clause, wrote for
the plurality of four Justices and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for lacking "the immediacy
which is an indispensable condition of constitutional adjudication." Id. at 508. Frankfurter
also cited Brandeis' opinion in Ashwander and stressed the importance of judicial restraint,
along with the need to avoid reaching constitutional issues "in advance of the strictest neces-
sity." Id. at 503. In contrast, Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court's other leading "con-
servative," dissented and explained that the Court's judgment "does violence to established
concepts of 'justiciability.' " Id. at 522-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan cited Brandeis by
name in three different places and quoted from Brandeis' opinions in both Gilbert and
Olmstead,, terming the latter "the most comprehensive statement of the principle of liberty"
that undergirded the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Along
with other precedents, Brandeis' opinions supported the proposition "that the Constitution
protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever character,"
and "the intrusion of the whole machinery of the criminal law into the very heart of marital
privacy ...... Poe, 267 U.S. at 550, 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Thus, such intrusion
"marks an abridgment of important fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting). There is substantial tension, for example,
between Brandeis' famous commitment to privacy and his insistence on the need for exten-
sive governmental investigatory power to enforce the law, especially against corporate inter-
ests. See KERSCH, supra note 158, at 56-60.
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tive norms to determine when and why it is legitimate. Strict "legal-
ists" adopt formalistic methods that strive to cabin and legitimate
change by portraying it as, in some essential sense, not truly change,
but instead only the result of implicit and logical exfoliations from
unchanging constitutional principles."' Such approaches, employing
varieties of flexible word play, thus accept change by giving it a dif-
ferent name and masking the awkward facts of history with the
smothering blanket of blinkered legal formalism.1 8 9
Less formalistic and more realistic constitutionalists accept
and often emphasize the fact of change, adding to the role of constitu-
tional text, structure, and doctrine the shaping force of changing so-
cial conditions, cultural values, and political movements. 19 0 At the
same time, however, they also seek to both justify and ultimately
constrain such change by integrating it into some broader normative
vision that offers a reasoned connection to the Constitution.191 Some
emphasize fundamental moral principles that they find embedded in
the Constitution and justify change when it accords with those moral
norms. 19 2 Others justify change by socializing and institutionalizing
188 Brian Z. Tamanaha, Balanced Realism on Judging, 44 VAL. L. REv. 1243, 1264
(2010).
189 Felix Frankfurter adopted a version of this approach when he defended the New Deal's
broadened use of the commerce power. He argued that economic changes "bring into play
the affirmative possibilities of the authority over commerce granted to Congress" while
warning against questioning the supremacy of law's internal logic. Any attempt to interpret
trends in American constitutional history outside the frame of professed doctrine, he de-
clared, "calls for the utmost wariness." FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER
MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 8 (1937).
190 TUSHNET, supra note 176, at 271-72 (stating "[w]hat [U.S.] constitutional history
shows, though, is that understanding the Constitution as it is requires us to pay relatively lit-
tle attention to the written Constitution, somewhat more attention to the way in which the
courts interpret the written Constitution, and a great deal of attention to the organization of
politics by political parties under presidential leadership and to the principles that dominant
parties and their presidents articulate.").
191 TUSHNET, supra note 176, at 271-72.
192 Although not a historian, Ronald Dworkin has repeatedly insisted that constitutional
issues and judgments must be grounded in sound judgments of moral philosophy. See
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
3 (1996). The leading constitutional scholar of an earlier generation, Edward Corwin, made
essentially the same point: "[T]he Supreme Court is vested with substantially complete free-
dom of choice [in construing the constitution, but w]ith this freedom there goes inevitably an
equally broad moral responsibility." EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 182 (1934) (emphasis in original). As
a more recent scholar wrote, changes are justified when they make "substantive contribu-
tions to the noblest causes that human institutions can and therefore should be made to
serve." Rogers M. Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction: The Limits of Legalism, 108 YALE
L.J. 2039, 2075 (1999) [hereinafter Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction].
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it within the governmental structures that the Constitution establishes,
especially the Article III judiciary.' 93 One version of the latter ap-
proach emphasizes the channeling power of established legal doc-
trines that work themselves out slowly through those constitutionally
ordained institutions.' 94 Another version stresses the dual restraining
and adapting powers of a deeply ingrained tradition of careful and
small-step common-law judging.'9 5 Both tend to downplay the direct
impact of external political developments on constitutional interpreta-
tion and highlight what they consider as the tenaciously constraining
and channeling force of the law's internal elements.1 96
Yet other constitutionalists place greater weight on external
social and political forces' 97 and justify constitutional change by root-
ing it not only in a reasoned connection with the Constitution but,
Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction, supra note 192, at 2049.
194 E.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW
DEAL 31 (2000).
195 HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 127 (1990) (stating that "the common-law method of consti-
tutional adjudication ... better explains the Supreme Court's role in American government"
than originalism or other theories and "has the advantage of building change into law,
change that takes into account contemporary substantive values as well as participation[ I
values."). Accord STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 3-4, 118; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many
and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753,
1815 (2015) [hereinafter Fallon, Constitutional Adjudication].
196 Disputes about the relative importance of internal and external forces on constitutional
change and on the Supreme Court's decision making are unanswerable as a general matter
and can only be resolved in terms of specific times, places, issues, judges, and decisions, and
then only to the extent that there is adequate evidence in the historical record. See, e.g., Ed-
ward A. Purcell, Jr., National League of Cities: Judicial Decision-Making and the Nature of
Constitutional Federalism, 91 DENVER U.L. REv. 179, 179-80 (2014).
197 In explaining constitutional change, for example, some versions stress the role of mass
social movements. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2064
(2002); William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Diferent from All Other Rights Talk?
Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1772 (1994);
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1326-27 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Siegel, Constitutional Culture]. Other versions highlight the driving role of "transforma-
tive" presidencies. E.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 265 (2005) (explaining
that the election of popular presidents with new political mandates created "a recurring insti-
tutional dynamic" that repeatedly led the Court to take on "the arduous task of creating a liv-
ing constitutional law . . . . "); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS To BILL CLINTON, at xiv (1997) (explaining that "[m]y case
for the presidency is that it has been a singularly persistent source of change, a transforma-
tive element engrained in the Constitution itself.").
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more directly, in the Constitution's underlying principle of popular
sovereignty.198 One variation argues that over time the Court finds
legalistic ways to adapt constitutional law to the prevailing views and
values of the American people and that constitutional change is justi-
fied by popular approval from below. 9 9 A second variation focuses
more narrowly on the rise of new political coalitions that come to
dominate the institutions of government through popular elections,
thereby establishing new "regimes" with distinctive constitutional
values that are buoyed by widespread popular support.2 00 A third var-
iation incorporates "originalist" elements and argues that the Consti-
tution establishes a structural "framework" for democratic politics,
but leaves most substantive policy issues open for determination by
democratic political developments in the future.2 0 ' A fourth and
somewhat more formally normative variation confers on certain ma-
jor changes an express constitutional legitimacy, identifying special
"moments" when particularly powerful and sustained popular move-
198 Of course, virtually all American constitutionalists base their theories in one way or
another on the Constitution's principle of popular sovereignty, but the key question always
remains how exactly they explain the connection. "Originalist" theories, for example, com-
monly argue that the text of the Constitution as understood by the founders and ratifiers is
the only proper basis for constitutional interpretation because it is only the text itself that has
been approved by the people. For one statement of this idea, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 128-29 (1999).
'9 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 176, at 365-68. See also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEw 247-48 (2004). As Ed-
ward S. Corwin wrote in challenging the idea that the Supreme Court was the Constitution's
sole authoritative voice, "judicial review is a process of popular government." EDWARD S.
CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
POPULAR GOVERNMENT 176 (Peter Smith 1957) (1938).
200 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-2008, at ix
(2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court is best understood "as part of a ruling regime do-
ing its bit to implement the regime's policies. Some of its most historically controversial
decisions seem far less controversial when set within the politics of the time. Justices are,
after all, subject to the same economic, social, and intellectual currents as other upper-
middle-class professional elites."). The classic statement of "regime" theory appears in
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Poli-
cy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 279-80 (1957). See Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial
Independence? The Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
511, 519 (2007).
201 Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
641, 646 (2013) [hereinafter Balkin, The New Originalism] (stating that such "framework
originalism is both originalist and compatible with a living Constitution."). See also JACK
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 10, 12 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM];
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
453, 456-58 (2013); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE
L.J. 408,449 (2007).
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ments lead the nation's political institutions to accept de facto chang-
es as validly adopted constitutional amendments.20 2
In spite of their sometimes substantial differences, all those
theories accept the fact of constitutional change, and they understand
that change-with varying emphases-as a culturally-rooted, institu-
tionally channeled, professionally disciplined, morally guided, and
politically molded reality. Thus, in their light, it is entirely under-
standable why, as a general matter, Brandeis' jurisprudence would
almost necessarily produce both contributions and cast-offs and why,
as a particular matter, only specific historical analysis-not the
words, text, or principles of the Constitution-can truly explain the
origin and fate of each of those contributions and each of those cast-
offs.
C. Denying the Legitimacy of Constitutional Change:
Originalism
Some other commentators, however, acknowledge the fact of
constitutional change but vigorously condemn it.203 The view "that
the Constitution must be changed from time to time and that this
Court is charged with a duty to make those changes," Justice Hugo L.
Black declared, was profoundly wrong.2 04 Justice Black stated that
"[fjor myself, I must with all due deference reject that philosophy."2 05
The founding fathers "knew the need for change," he explained, and
they provided in Article V's formal amendment process the only
proper method for making such changes.2 06
202 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 92-93 (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 312 (1998); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 3 (2014).
203 EPSTEIN, supra note 179, at 281 (stating that "[t]he New Deal is inconsistent with the
principles of limited government and with the constitutional provisions designed to secure
that end.") (emphasis in original); MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DowN CONSTITUTION 9
(2012) (explaining that a "dynamic began to unfold in the 1870s and accelerated thereafter,"
and in the New Deal the "Supreme Court abandoned the [earlier] competitive rules and in-
stead embraced a constitutional order that facilitates the formation of state cartels ..... ).
See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, at x-xi
(2006) (discussing that "standard interferences with employment contracts, such as mini-
mum wage laws, antidiscrimination laws (in competitive markets only), collective bargain-
ing laws, and Social Security requirements [are] unconstitutional . . . . ").
204 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
206 Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining "[t]hat method of change was good for our Fa-
thers, and being somewhat [old-fashioned] I must add it is good enough for me."). For a fur-
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Black's position was hardly new. Such originalist claims
seem intrinsic to a legal system based on a written constitution, and
from the Republic's earliest years commentators have advanced them
in one form or another to support a spectrum of claims.2 07 Such
originalists assume that the Constitution today means what it meant
to the founding generation and-their decisive claim-that its origi-
nal meaning can be identified and deployed to decide specific con-
temporary issues correctly.2 0 8
The essence of the matter, however, is that such specifically
directive originalism is wholly inadequate to justify its pretensions.2 09
ther in-depth examination on Black and his jurisprudence, see generally GERALD T. DUNNE,
HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A
BIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 1994). Justice Scalia took a position similar to Black's in addressing the
Eighth Amendment:
Bound down, indeed. What a mockery today's opinion makes of Hamil-
ton's expectation, announcing the Court's conclusion that the meaning of
our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years--not, mind you, that
this Court's decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution
has changed. The Court reaches this implausible result by purporting to
advert, not to the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, but to "the
evolving standards of decency," of our national society .... Because I
do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more
than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be de-
termined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-
minded foreigners, I dissent.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted).
207 See, e.g., R.B. BERNSTEIN, Legacies: What History Has Made of the Founding Fathers,
in THE FOUNDING FATHERS RECONSIDERED 115, 115-67 (2009); JOHNATHAN O'NEILL,
ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICs: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1, 2 (2005). One
relatively recent form, related to the revival of libertarian and classical economic theory, in-
volves the claim that the Constitution is linked to classical "liberal," market, social contract
thinking. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN
QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 4, 6 (2014); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE
CONSTITUTION: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY 5 (2014).
208 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 843 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Craw-
ford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)) (explaining that "[t]he proper course of consti-
tutional interpretation is to give the text the meaning it was understood to have at the time of
its adoption by the people."). Most originalists, however, also dilute their methodological
claims in various ways, acknowledging although seldom specifying the limits of the dilution.
See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 130 (2014) (discussing that Justice
Scalia declared in his confirmation hearing, "I think that there are some provisions of the
Constitution that may have a certain amount of evolutionary content within them .... " .
Some hybrid forms of "originalism," especially those advanced since the 1980s, are far more
modest and embrace the practice of adaptive and changing "interpretations" of the Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 201, at 10, 12; Balkin, The New
Originalism, supra note 201, at 641.
20 The literature identifying the inadequacies of originalism is vast. The briefest sam-
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The issues that the Constitution clearly settles have long been settled,
while those that it does not clearly settle have become the stuff of
new or recurring constitutional debates, shifting constitutional under-
standings, and often changing constitutional law.2 10 Most, if not all,
of the controversial and disputed issues that arise in the modem
world fall into the latter category.
Specifically directive "original" meanings either cannot be
discovered at all or the shards of relevant evidence in the historical
record prove too vague, obscure, diverse, oblique, limited, ambigu-
ous, or contradictory to provide clear and specific direction.2 1 1 Fur-
ther, the nation and the world have changed so drastically since the
founding that many "original" meanings, even if they could be accu-
rately and clearly identified, would not have the practical significance
in the twenty-first century that they were understood to have in the
eighteenth.2 12 Revealingly, and as a result, originalists have produced
no settled, consistent, and coherent methodology and have, instead,
advanced a seemingly infinite variety of flawed-and usually elu-
sively qualified-theories, methods, and assumptions that have led to
wide ranges of conflicting conclusions.2 13 Indeed, there seem nearly
pling includes the following: RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2004); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS (2002); KENT GREENAWALT, INTERPRETING TRE CONSTITUTION (2015); H.
JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BASED ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND
POLITICS (2002); Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32 (2004);
Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 311 (1996).
210 Originalist arguments are, in fact, seldom decisive, and they are commonly paired with
other types of arguments that range from the lofty philosophical to the bluntly practical. See,
e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9-12 (1921); Fallon, Constitutional Adjudication, supra
note 195, at 1760-63, 1770.
211 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 133 (1996) (stating that "the very extent and diversity of the records of ratifi-
cation give intellectual license to a host of interpretative strategies ... [fmrom such a body of
writings, many an interpretation can be plausibly sustained, few conclusively verified or fal-
sified."). The Court sometimes acknowledges as much. Justice Powell once wrote that "[a]t
most, then, the historical materials show that--to the extent this question was debated--the
intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers [of the Eleventh Amendment] were ambiguous.").
Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483-84.
212 The Supremacy Clause was "originally" intended to ensure that properly ratified trea-
ties trumped inconsistent state laws, but its meaning was altered over time and then changed
radically in the twentieth century to accommodate profound changes in both the foreign rela-
tion needs of the United States and the domestic demands of American politics. See DAVID
L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 27
(2016).
213 Some originalists acknowledge many of the differences that divide them. For a de-
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as many originalisms as there are originalists, and deciding between
any two versions of specifically directive originalism is like deciding
which of Huck Finn's raft mates, the Duke or the Dauphin, was of
nobler birth.
Equally to the point, and contrary to its advocates' claims, 2 14
originalism does little or nothing to confine judicial discretion and
limit subjective constitutional interpretation.2 1 5 Originalist arguments
are commonly invoked by all sides in constitutional controversies,
and they are readily adapted to support a wide range of conflicting
positions. 216  The sweeping spectacle of contemporary originalisms
does little but confirm that originalist methodologies determine pre-
cious little, while the practical goals and ideological premises of their
varying proponents determine almost all.2 17
tailed discussion of different originalist theories, see Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political
Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REv. 625 (2012). Compare, e.g., the disagreements between two
self-proclaimed originalists: RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) with Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative
Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1081 (2005). See generally Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE
L.J. 239 (2009); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Marriage Equality Cases and Constitutional
Theory, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 111 (2015); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as
a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006).
214 E.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 198, at 47-61; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 863-64 (1989).
215 The outcomes of cases are "based on ideology" rather than originalist sources and
show "that originalism is no more constraining than alterative theories of interpretation."
FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 193 (2013). See, e.g., Michael W.
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111
HARV. L. REv. 153, 163-64 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Pub-
lic Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CH I. L. REv. 115, 160 n.202 (1992).
For an analogous argument about the inevitable need for value judgments in statutory inter-
pretation, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist
Theories of Statutory Interpretation--And the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment
Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REv. 685 (2014).
216 Such divergent originalisms are hardly new. Chief Justice John Marshall relied on
originalist sources in defending the Second Bank of the United States, for example, while
Spencer Roane, one of his principal adversaries, equally invoked originalist arguments to
prove Marshall wrong. PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 186. The Chief Justice
wound up charging that Roane's view of the Constitution's original meaning stemmed from
"deep-rooted and vindictive hate," while Roane retorted that Marshall's interpretation
proved him "a deplorable idiot." PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 186. For other
classic examples of conflicting originalist arguments, see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393, 405, 426-27 (1857), and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (majority opinion).
217 CROSS, supra note 215, at 190-91 (stating that "[t]he study of the results of cases decid-
ed using the most prominent originalist sources suggests that the theory is not a meaningful
one in the sense of determining case outcomes. The justices all appear to fit those originalist
sources to the support of their preferred resolution of the case. Originalism is commonly
manipulated."). In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy appealed to originalist sources in opposing
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In fact, originalist methodologies and the historical materials
that they cite are easily, commonly, and often purposely manipulat-
ed.218 Justice Black's rejection of change by judicial interpretation,
for example, was an act of high irony, for he was one of the Justices
who radically changed the meaning and application of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.2 19 Similarly, the Court's re-
cent decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,2 2 0 commonly cited as
a paradigmatic example of originalist reasoning, demonstrates the
same point.2 2 1 There, the Justices divided sharply over the interpreta-
tion of scattered, diverse, conflicting, and inconclusive historical ma-
terials, with the two opposed sides interpreting their self-selected
the conclusions of the dissenting Justice Scalia. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742-43, 745-46,
752. Similarly, in Citizens United, Justice Stevens dissented using an originalist argument,
while Justice Scalia concurred and advanced an originalist counterargument supporting the
Court's decision. 558 U.S. 310, 385, 393 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (Scalia, J., concurring). Compare, e.g., AKHL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005) (proposing originalist interpretation), with AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE
BY (2012) (modifying, and arguably departing from, originalist interpretation), and with
Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Saving Originalism, 113 MICH. L. REv. 1081, 1084, 1086
(2015) (explaining that "[c]orrecting originalism's perceived shortcomings forces Amar to
turn ever more intricate interpretative somersaults" and leaves him with "no limiting princi-
ple.").
218 Condemning the views of John Marshall and Daniel Webster, for example, John Tay-
lor of Caroline and John C. Calhoun, had no trouble proving that their extreme states' rights
doctrines represented the authentic original command of the Constitution. JOHN TAYLOR,
TYRANNY UNMASKED 100 (F. Thornton Miller ed., 1992) (1822) (stating that broad construc-
tion of national powers renders the "true intention of the constitution inefficacious and nuga-
tory."). See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the
United States, in UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 64,
65 (Ross M. Lence ed. 1992) (explaining that to show that the Constitution did not establish
a national government, "it will be necessary to trace the expression to its origin."). For a
more recent example, see Kristin A. Collins, "A Considerable Surgical Operation": Article
III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 337-43 (2010)
(describing Justice Frankfurter's inconsistent and inaccurate use of appeals to the intent of
the Framers).
219 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89, 91-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(stating that "I would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment -- to extend to all the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of
Rights."). In Rochin v. California, Black reached his favored result by "torturing the Fifth
Amendment." 342 U.S. 165, 174-77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); POWE, supra note 201, at
227. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 119,
120-21 (1965).
220 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 54 U.S. 570 (2008).
221 Id. at 576-77. See, e.g., JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND
CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 345-49 (2009); Delahunty &
Yoo, supra note 218, at 1088, 1093.
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shards through their opposed ideological lenses.22 2 Thus, specifically
directive originalism only produces ever more fully weaponized-but
radically conflicting-versions of the nation's history and constitu-
tional law.
To label Heller and similar decisions originalist reminds of
the story about Lincoln asking his cabinet how many legs a dog
would "have if you call[ed] its tail a leg." "Four," Lincoln famously
answered, for calling the tail a leg does not "make it a leg." Similar-
ly, calling an opinion originalist does not make it an opinion deter-
mined by originalist sources. Heller, in fact, is inconceivable as a
product of constitutional change absent the modem gun-rights
movement, its avid embrace by the Republican Party, and its joint
success in placing on the Supreme Court many ideological compatri-
ots. 223
Most important for understanding American constitutional-
ism, as Heller and other purportedly "originalist" decisions illustrate,
is the fact that originalism is itself a doctrine of constitutional
change.22 4 in essence, originalism is a rhetorical trope for those who
seek to overturn prevailing meanings and understandings in the name
of allegedly older ones.225 The fact is, however, that those allegedly
222 STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 20 (stating that Heller was as a paradigmatic example of
"[w]hen historical materials are vague or confused, as they routinely will be, there is an
overwhelming temptation for a judge to see in them what the judge wants to see in them.").
For the arbitrary rhetorical move that anchored the Court's reasoning, see Steven L. Winter,
Frame Semantics and the 'Internal Point of View,' in 15 LAW AND LANGUAGE: CURRENT
LEGAL ISSUES 2011 115, 119-20 (Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013).
223 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARv. L. REv. 191, 191-95 (2008). Not surprisingly, Heller's result is fully con-
sistent with the insistent personal values of the opinion's author. BISKUPIC, supra note 222, at
345-46, 363. Indicative of the manipulability of originalist reasoning and the pressing force
of judicial ideology, consider the position of Heller's author on substantive due process,
where he argued that such rights should be limited to their "most specific level" of meaning.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). Applying that principle, an original-
ist could readily conclude that the right recognized in Heller should be limited to the keeping
of muzzle-loading, ball-firing, single-shot firearms.
224 BALKIN, LIviNG ORIGINALISM, supra note 202, at 11 (stating that "[m]ost successful
political and social movements in America's history have claimed authority for change in
just this way: either as a call to return to the enduring principles of the Constitution or as a
call for fulfillment of those principles.").
225 Modern, specifically directive "originalism" flourished within the Republican Party as
a political jurisprudence designed to undermine post-New Deal liberalism and the decisions
of the Warren Court. By claiming that eighteenth- and nineteenth- century attitudes deter-
mined constitutional meaning, conservatives believed they could strengthen their legal and
historical arguments against the things they opposed: gay rights, abortion, gun control, af-
firmative action, social welfare programs, restrictions on the death penalty, expansive tort
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older "original" meanings and understandings are either too vague
and indeterminate to carry the weight claimed for them, or they have
been specifically and selectively retrofitted to advance the particular
contemporary goals and purposes of their current advocates.
It is no surprise, then, that when the New Deal Court changed
the law, it sometimes did so in the name of "restoring" the Constitu-
tion's original meaning.2 Nor that when the Warren Court changed
the law, it too sometimes used originalist rhetoric to help justify those
changes.227 Nor, most recently, that when the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts changed the law, they also sometimes claimed originalist jus-
tifications.228 All show that originalism is simply another method of
legal argument, employed when serviceable, sometimes invoked and
sometimes ignored, and functioning to sustain, while seeking to mask
and deny, the reality of American constitutionalism.22 9 Thus, there is
no realistic question about choosing between a "living" and an
"originalist" constitutionalism, only the question of choosing what
kind of changing constitutionalism Americans wish to acknowledge
and accept.230
liability, rigid separation of church and state, institutional reform litigation, and broad federal
anti-discrimination laws. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Courts, Federalism, and the Federal
Constitution, 1920-2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER (1920--), 127, 161-62 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 2008). See generally CROSS, supra note 216.
226 Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 30, 56-57 (1993). Felix Frankfurter presented
a classic example of New Deal "restorationism:" "After a brave effort to confine the New
Deal," he wrote, "the old Court surrendered in the spring of 1937--and returned to the Mar-
shall-Taney-Waite view of national power." Allen R. Kamp, Constitutional Interpretation
and Technological Change, 49 NEW ENG. L. REv. 201, 219 n.150 (2015) (citing
FRANKFURTER, supra note 190, at 116).
227 The Warren Court "used originalist sources quite frequently, more so than did previous
Courts," though its "apparent reliance on originalism in some cases may simply have been as
a rhetorical tool in service to an outcome-oriented agenda." CROSS, supra note 216, at 96.
See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PENN. L.
REv. 1, 22-23 (1998); Kelly, supra note 220, at 125.
228 CROSS, supra note 216, at 98; Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEx. L.
REv. 1, 29 n.74 (2009); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 691, 713 (2009).
229 Accord Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 202, at 649-50; Colby & Smith, su-
pra note 214, at 307 (stating that originalism "is in fact a loose collection of a staggering ar-
ray of often inconsistent approaches to constitutional interpretation. And the approaches
themselves continue to change and evolve, sometimes too fast for anyone to keep up.
Originalists might despise the notion of a 'living constitution,' but they have gone a long
way toward creating a living constitutionalism of their own--the very existence of which un-
dermines much of their own rhetorical and normative claims to superiority.").
230 Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 202, at 718-19. Of course the Constitution is
not "living," and it is not an "organism," as common metaphorical usages might seem to
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Specifically directive originalism thus purports to make the
Constitution something that it is not and cannot be, a predetermined
mandate for future times and the foundation of an unchanging consti-
tutional law. Its ultimate flaw, then, is that in proposing to address
modem controversies it counsels us most unwisely, urging us to turn
from grappling with the pressing challenges of the present to confect-
ing subjectively imagined mandates from the past.
V. HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE TRUE ORIGINALISM
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
While the Constitution fails to settle most new and controver-
sial issues, it is helpful to remember that it also failed to settle a great
many other issues and that only subsequent social and political de-
velopments were able to settle some, but not all, of those.2 3 ' The
Constitution did not settle the principle that Congress had the power
to create the First and Second Banks of the United States.23 2 The
evolution of the party system, the disastrous war of 1812, the growth
of the nation's economy, the conversion of James Madison, and the
presence of Marshall and Story on the Supreme Court had far more to
do with settling that issue than anything in the Constitution itself.233
suggest. The Constitution instead is the written foundation of American constitutionalism, a
tenacious and evolving practice that seeks to maintain fidelity to its text, principles, struc-
tures and values while interpreting, shaping, and applying them in adaptive, effective, and
desirable ways.
231 Examples could be endlessly multiplied. For example, despite its explicit textual man-
date, the Constitution did not even settle the principle that treaties were the "supreme Law of
the Land." U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. To the contrary, the emergence of the United States as
a world power, the complexities of international relations, and intense political opposition to
the emergence of movements for international human rights and domestic civil rights settled
the quite different principle--manifestly contrary to the facial command of the constitutional
text--that treaties are supreme law only under certain special and highly circumscribed polit-
ical conditions. Martin S. Flaherty, Global Power in an Age of Rights: Historical Commen-
tary, 1946-2000, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE, 416, 420, 422-23, 426 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey, & William S. Dodge
eds., 2011) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW].
232 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324 (1819).
233 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a Na-
tional Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 24 JANUARY To 31
MARCH 1791 275, 276 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974). See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Introduction to
JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 1, 3-8 (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969) (showing the exchange between John Marshall and Spencer Roane over
the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States.). Opponents of both banks
developed elaborate constitutional and originalist arguments against their constitutionality.
See, e.g., Mr. James Madison, Remarks from Debate in the House of Representatives (Feb.
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The Constitution did not settle the principle that the Union was per-
manent and that states could not secede.2 3 4 The slavery controversy,
the election of Abraham Lincoln, and Northern victory in the Civil
War settled that principle. 23 5 The Constitution did not settle the prin-
ciple that presidents could conclude binding agreements with foreign
nations without the Senate's approval.2 36 Economic expansion, the
demands of international commerce, practicalities of conducting for-
eign policy, and the emergence of an increasingly powerful executive
branch settled that principle.23 7 Indeed, the three Civil War Amend-
ments did not settle the principle that governments are required to ac-
cord full equality to all Americans or that racial discrimination and
disenfranchisement are unconstitutional.2 38 Only massive social
changes, the Second World War, the emergence of a vigorous Civil
Rights Movement, and profound shifts in American politics and cul-
ture settled-albeit still quite imperfectly-those principles.23 9
What, in fact, the Constitution itself did originally-and still
does-is essentially five things, none of which is to provide specific
direction in resolving most, if any, seriously controverted modern is-
sues. The Constitution establishes the nation's complex structure of
2, 1791), in A SECOND FEDERALIST: CONGRESS CREATES A GOVERNMENT 126 (Charles S.
Hyneman & George W. Carey eds., 1967).
234 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 700-01 (1868).
235 Id. at 727-28.
236 Craig Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 347 (1955).
237 Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1901-1945, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 232, at 217-18, 220-22. Similarly, the Constitution did not settle the princi-
ple that the executive can terminate treaties, but that principle has gradually become estab-
lished. Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEx. L. REV. 773,
773 (2014).
238 Baldly ignoring history in an effort to reconcile originalism with the principle of racial
equality, Justice Scalia argued that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments "leave no
room for doubt that laws treating people differently because of their race are invalid." Rutan
v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As a matter of
historical fact, those amendments were understood for some seventy-five years to allow per-
vasive racial discrimination and abuse in the United States. As late as 1959, after Brown v.
Board of Education, for example, William F. Buckley argued in lofty philosophical terms
that the South had the right to disenfranchise blacks notwithstanding the language of the
Constitution. W[LLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., UP FROM LIBERALISM 126-27, 129-30 (1959). Invok-
ing such an abstract and ahistorical fiat illustrates the plasticity and manipulability of
originalist arguments. See Ronald Turner, A Critique ofJustice Antonin Scalia's Originalist
Defense of Brown v. Board of Education, 62 U.C.L.A. L. REv. DISCOURSE 170, 183-84
(2014).
239 E.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM J[M CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 3-6 (2004).
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checking governmental institutions; it prescribes certain basic politi-
cal and institutional principles such as representative government; it
affirms the inspiring ideal of reasoned and limited constitutional gov-
ernment; it mandates certain republican political and moral values;
and it stands as a paramount and compelling symbol of national unity
and human community. 240 Its brilliance-and ultimately its inherent
risk-lies precisely in the fact that it constrains and channels, but
does not direct. Thus, it not only allows change but embraces it,
while at the same time mandating as well as words can that such
change come through the structures it establishes, comports with the
principles it enshrines, and ultimately meets the approval of the peo-
ple it governs.
Thus, while originalism as a specifically directive method of
constitutional interpretation is a chimera, originalism in a far different
and more realistic sense is vital. American constitutionalism is based
on a shared communal faith that the Constitution is binding and au-
thoritative and that the understandings of its framers and ratifiers may
prove important guides in understanding its meaning, applying its
principles, and honoring its values. 241  At a deeply embedded social
and cultural level, such a communal belief is a core component of
American life, law, and government and a profound source of the na-
tional unity. Indeed, this seems the Constitution's most commonly
recognized virtue, one that scholars on all sides embrace.24 2 That
240 PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 196-200.
241 Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, for example, certainly no originalist, nonetheless fol-
lowed traditional constitutional argumentation when he invoked " 'the free exercise' of reli-
gion as the phrase was understood by the founders of the nation." Hamilton v. Regents of the
Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245, 265-66 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
242 Not surprisingly, James Madison understood the point. The Constitution, he declared
in his first inaugural address in 1809, was "the cement of the Union." James Madison, Inau-
gural Address (Mar. 4, 1809), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 47, 49 (Gaillard Hunt
ed. 1908); STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 101 (explaining that "[t]he written Constitution is
valuable because it provides a common ground among the American people, and in that way
makes it possible for us to settle disputes that might otherwise be intractable and destruc-
tive."). More recently, James Boyd White made the point from the perspective of language
and rhetoric. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS
AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 246 (1984) (discussing
that the Constitution "establishes a new conversation on a permanent basis" and thus "consti-
tutes a rhetorical community."). For contemporary views, see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note
218, at 1113 (explaining that "[b]y encouraging fidelity to the original bargain that created
and renewed the Union, originalism can help to keep that Union alive and well."); Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, supra note 198, at 1419 (stating that "[w]hen citizens who passion-
ately disagree about the terms of collective life can advance their contending visions as the
outworking of the nation's founding commitments, they belong to a common community,
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communal faith underwrites a sustaining conviction that Americans
share fundamental premises even though, in ever-recurring constitu-
tional disputes, they proceed by drawing from those premises nar-
rower, more particular, and more immediately serviceable principles
that allow them to justify sharply conflicting conclusions.2 43  That
true communal originalism is not a method of finding specific direc-
tion on controverted issues, but part of the social and institutional
glue that helps hold the American people together and induces them
to debate rather than fight.
Thus, the reality of this communal originalism is a fundamen-
tal element of the answer to the question that many of those who de-
ny the legitimacy of constitutional change seem to regard-quite
wrongly-as unanswerable: To repeat their question: What is the
point of a written constitution if its meanings and interpretations
change? 244 The answer-entirely accurate as a matter of the nation's
history and crucial to an understanding of its constitutionism-is that,
together with its other establishing contributions, the written Consti-
tution helps knit Americans together in their common effort to main-
tain a free, open, tolerant, and democratic society. It undergirds a
collective national enterprise in democratic self-government anchored
in efforts to interpret its text, structure, and principles in ways that al-
low the American people to share a bonding sense of common values
while vigorously and sometimes bitterly disputing the policies neces-
sary to confront the challenges of an ever-changing world.2 45
To understand American constitutionalism in this manner
helps develop a deeper understanding not just of Americans in the
past, but of ourselves in the present. It is a method that urges us to
try to understand how we come to embrace the values we hold and,
consequently, why we adopt the constitutional views we espouse. It
is especially important for Justices on the United States Supreme
Court, for if they would be truly wise and properly restrained, they
despite deep disagreement about its ideal form.").
243 RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 302 (2008) (stating that "in most constitu-
tional disputes, the disputants are not arguing from common premises.").
244 As Justice Black stated the point, the idea that the Constitution's meaning changes over
the years is "an attack" on the very "concept of a written constitution." GARY L. MCDOWELL,
EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 129 (1982).
245 Constitutional change sometimes occurs through the formal amendment process, but
this is relatively rare and frequently of lesser importance, as amendments often function in
large part to ratify social and attitudinal changes that have already occurred or are substan-
tially underway. See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 115-18.
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must first understand not just the law, but themselves.24 6 They must
strive to understand why exactly they hold certain personal views and
values, how many of those views and values were shaped by sources
outside the Constitution, and how some of those views and values
have in turn helped shape their understanding of the Constitution it-
self. Above all, they must strive to understand how those views and
values may-consciously or unconsciously, properly or improperly-
press them to shape the law in their service. Surely, no candid and
self-conscious judge could possibly consider him or herself as merely
a non-discretionary "umpire" calling balls and strikes in accord with
some pre-existing and objective standard.2 47
VI. CONCLUSION
Louis Brandeis understood both the underlying communal
function of the Constitution and the institutional tensions it structured
in channeling conflict and enabling reasoned and ordered change.
His jurisprudence embraced that communal function while seeking to
utilize those institutional tensions to the nation's best advantage. One
can fairly criticize many aspects of his career and jurisprudence, in-
cluding the methods he used, the values he cherished, the goals he
sought, the reasons he advanced, and the judgments he reached. One
cannot fairly criticize him, however, for attempting-within the lim-
ited confines of his judicial role-to articulate reasoned constitutional
arguments supported by empirical evidence and practical insight to
adapt the law to meet what he considered the most pressing needs of
the nation, its people, and its democratic government.
To one degree or another, all Justices have done that, even if
they were largely or wholly unaware of the way their personal views
and values were shaping their constitutional thinking. All the truly
"great" Justices have also done that, too, but they-like Brandeis-
have done so by and large consciously and purposely. That truth
stands-for good as well as possible ill-as an intrinsic, dynamic,
and fundamental element of American constitutionalism.
246 Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Ju-
risprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 418-
19(2004).
247 PowE, supra note 200, at 342 (testifying before Congress at the hearing on his nomina-
tion to the Court, now Chief Justice John Roberts "absurdly analogized a justice to an um-
pire.").
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